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NOTES

BIRTH OF A NEW AGE: A COMPREHENSIVE
REVIEW OF NEW YORK INHERITANCE LAW
RESPONDING TO ADVANCES IN
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
CATHERINE BELFI*
INTRODUCTION

Notwithstanding theories of creationism, it can be said that human
reproduction has always required sexual intercourse between a man and a
woman.1 Throughout history, humans-especially females-have
attempted to control their own fertility by ascribing to cultural practices,
ingesting herbal supplements, and even summoning the graces of powerful

* J.D. Candidate, June 2009, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 2006, Columbia University.
1 See Michael Kirby, Medical Technology and New Frontiersof Family Law, in LEGAL ISSUES IN
HUMAN REPRODUCTION 3, 4 (Sheila McLean ed., 1989) (finding that the normal method of human

conception has been through sexual intercourse); see also Ben Schuman, Note, Gods & Gays:
Analyzing the Same-Sex Marriage Debate from a Religious Perspective, 96 GEO. L.J. 2103, 2111
(2008) (stating that "as [men and women] mate . . . [they] fulfill the behavioral conditions of
reproduction, or, if you will, perform the type of act - the only type of act - upon which the gift of a
child may supervene").
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fertility deities. 2 Today, modem science has equipped women with a set of
new, and perhaps more reliable, tools for controlling their fertility. 3 Some
scholars who recognized advances in contraception as having introduced
sex without reproduction, now recognize these advances in reproductive
technologies as having introduced reproduction without sex. 4 In the United
States, where infertility is an increasing problem, 5 advances in reproductive
6
technologies stand as a new beacon of hope in the quest for conception.
Roughly fifteen percent of the U.S. population that is of reproductive age
is infertile. 7 Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ARTs) have created a
multitude of reproduction options both for members of this challenged
class and for fertile individuals who rely on the procedures for other
reasons. 8 Human conception was initially refined by technology with the
2 See Linda M. Whiteford & Marilyn L. Poland, Introduction to NEW APPROACHES TO HUMAN
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 1, 1 (Linda M. Whiteford & Marilyn L. Poland eds., 1989) (stating that
for thousands of years, women have controlled their fertility through cultural practices and supernatural
means); see also RACHEL KRANZ, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND TECHNOLOGY 26 (2002) (illustrating
that midwives, folk wisdoms, and herbal remedies are used as ways of engendering wanted
pregnancies).
3 See Whiteford & Poland, supra note 2, at 2 (describing that a shift towards medical technology
will help control reproduction); see also Kirby, supranote 1,at 4 (noting that different advancements in
medical technology have refined the term "conception").
4 See Whiteford & Poland, supra note 2, at 4 (finding that a separation between sex and
reproduction creates new legal, ethical and social consequences); see also Rena M. Lindevaldsen,
Sacrificing Motherhood on the Altar of Political Correctness: Declaring a Legal Stranger To Be a
Parent over the Objections of the Child's Biological Parent,21 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2008-2009)
(stating that prior to the advances in reproductive technologies, women who gave birth to a child were
unequivocally the child's mother).
5 See John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the
New Reproduction, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN REPRODUCTION 6, 8 (Bonnie Steinbock

ed., 2002) (stating that in 1983, more than one in eight American married couples had failed to conceive
after one year of trying); see also KRANZ, supra note 2, at 51 (suggesting that the pressing problem of
infertility will only increase as more women postpone childrearing to pursue their careers).
6 See Whiteford & Poland, supra note 2, at 4 (listing the different advances in reproductive
technology); see also Joshua Kleinfeld, Tort Law and In Vitro Fertilization: The Need for Legal
Recognition of "ProcreativeInjury," 115 YALE L.J. 237, 244 (2005) (finding that in vitro fertilizations
bring new hope to would-be parents).
7 Emily McAllister, Defining the Parent-ChildRelationship in an Age of Reproductive Technology:
Implicationsfor Inheritance, 29 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 55, 56 (1994) (including this figure as an
introduction to an account from men and women about the struggle of infertility); Kirby, supra note 1,
at 4-5 (positing this percentage as an accepted estimate of the number of infertile married couples); see
Laura D. Heard, A Time To Be Born, A Time To Die: Alternative Reproduction and Texas ProbateLaw,
17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 927, 931 (1986) (providing statistics for the number of individual men and women
who face reproductive challenges; roughly one-fourth of America's men are functionally sterile, and
twenty-seven percent of women of child-bearing age have physical problems that prevent them from
procreating).
8 See Carl H. Coleman, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Constitution, 30 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 57, 57 (2002) (acknowledging that ARTs have expanded reproductive options for people
without fertility problems by permitting women to have children without a partner of the opposite sex);
see also Kirby, supra note 1,at 4 (recognizing the utility of reproductive technologies for homosexual
partners who resort to the procedures in lieu of heterosexual intercourse); CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR.
& MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO EMERGING
LAW AND SCIENCE 8-10 (2006) [hereinafter KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN 1](outlining examples of "non-

2009]

BIRTH OFA NEWAGE

introduction of artificial insemination (AI).9 Later advances, including in
vitro fertilization (IVF) and cryopreservation, further refined the process of
assisted reproduction.' 0 Today, the procreation process continues to evolve
with the development of new technologies. "I
As new technologies continue to advance, our society must determine
the appropriate degree of legal regulation of these procedures. Given the
jarring divide between law and science and the significant social utility of
reproductive technologies, some argue that government regulation of ARTs
should be strictly limited.12 On the other hand, given the extensive legal
implications that surround many new reproductive technologies and the
procedures they require, others argue in favor of governmental regulation. 13
At the root of this debate lies the enigmatic fundamental right to
procreation and the Supreme Court's interpretation of this principle.14
However, while that matter resounds within the halls of federal courts,
several states have legislatively responded to matters that are incidental to
traditional families" relying upon assisted reproductive technologies in order to procreate).
9 See Kirby, supra note 1, at 5 (highlighting Al as the oldest technique to overcome infertility, and
outlining the different types of Al); see also Kamran S. Moghissi, The Technology of AID and
Surrogacy, in NEW APPROACHES TO HUMAN REPRODUCTION 117, 117 (Linda M. Whiteford & Marilyn
L. Poland eds., 1989) (recounting the history of artificial insemination as having been first used in 1884
by John Hunter).
10 See Kirby, supra note 1,at 4-8 (observing the effect of individual advances in reproductive
technology over the course of time); see also Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Conceiving the Inconceivable:
Legal Recognition of the Posthumously Conceived Child, 34 ACTEC J.154, 154-55 (2008) (describing
the historical development of artificial insemination to modem advancements).
II See KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN I, supra note 8, at 8 (discussing recent advances in reproductive
technology including cryopreservation of embryos and sperm, and the application of cryopreservation
in conjunction with artificial insemination, which he refers to as "intrauterine insemination"); see also
McAllister, supra note 7, at 59-65 (outlining and describing several ARTs including the more modem
technologies of cryopreservation and embryo transfer).
12 Coleman, supra note 8, at 62 (referencing John Robertson, a leading commentator on the legal
implication of ARTs, and his view that government efforts to regulate the procedures should be subject
to "heightened judicial review"); see John A. Robertson, Two Models of Human Cloning, 27 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 609, 619 (1999) (arguing that persons should have a presumptive right to pursue reproductive
technologies, which should only be denied if there is a substantial harm from cloning to have
genetically-related children).
13 Coleman, supra note 8, at 63-64. Coleman discusses Anne Massie's narrow view of a
constitutional right to procreation based on that notion that ARTS "do not directly implicate the
values.., that are central to the privacy cases" in which a constitutional right to procreation has been
recognized. Id. Coleman also reviews Radhika Rao's similar view of procreative liberty, which suggests
that that the right extends only to reproductive activities "carried out exclusively between persons in
close personal relationships." Id. See Lawrence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the
Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1108 (1990). A right to privacy does not protect the
freedom of procreation but rather the freedom of intimate association. Id.
14 See HOWARD BALL, THE SUPREME COURT INTHE INTIMATE LIVES OF AMERICANS: BIRTH, SEX,
MARRIAGE, CHILDREARING, AND DEATH 13-22 (2002) (illustrating the Supreme Court's assertions
about the constitutional right to procreation through a discussion of several relevant Supreme Court
cases); see also Coleman, supra note 8, at 62 (suggesting that if the use of ARTs is not entitled to any
constitutional protection, the government will be able to regulate the procedures in any manner it
chooses, which does not violate the constitution or statutes in general).
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the use of ARTs.15
Considering the growing use of reproductive technologies as an
alternative method of procreation, it seems appropriate for states to remove
reproductive technologies from their "legal vacuum" 16 by passing
responsive legislation. In the case of inheritance laws, states have valid
reasons for passing responsive legislation because reproductive
technologies manipulate the "traditional human relationships" upon which
the law is based.17 For example, several reproductive technologies
introduce a third-party female into the procreation process and therefore
challenge the "previously incontestable assumption of maternal affiliation"
in inheritance law.18 Other legal implications of inheritance law arising out
of reproductive technologies include inheritance eligibility of children
conceived by reproductive technologies, finality of estates where sperm,
ovum (egg), or embryos have been frozen, and ownership of preserved
sperm, ovum, or embryos.19
New York statutory law has expressly addressed only the legitimacy of
children conceived by AI.20 However, New York courts have addressed
several other inheritance issues arising out of reproductive technology,
15 See 15 INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF LAWS ON ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 192-209 (Jan Stepan
ed., 1990) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF LAWS ] (listing state legislatures that have
addressed issues surrounding reproductive technology); see also In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207,
210 (Sur. Ct. 2007) (discussing the specific laws of Louisiana, California, and Florida that address the
inheritance rights of post-conceived children).
16 John G. New, "Aren't You Lucky You Have Two Mamas? ": Redefining Parenthoodin Light of
Evolving Reproductive Technologies and Social Change, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 773, 779 (2006) (noting
that IVF has posed problems for state courts in determining parentage, leaving questions of
"parenthood, custody, and duties of support in a legal vacuum that courts must struggle to fill"); Heard,
supra note 7, at 928 (citing Jirgen Neffe, In Vitro Fertilization,315 NATURE 446, 446 (1985) (stating
that in vitro is currently in a "legal vacuum")).
17 McAllister, supra note 7, at 58; see Heard, supra note 7, at 928-29 (arguing that reproductive
technologies have created many unsolved issues in the area of estates and wills).
18 Heard, supra note 7, at 940 (noting that a child may be considered illegitimate for inheritance
purposes if a reproductive procedure involves the contribution of a third party); see McAllister, supra
note 7, at 58 (explaining that there may be more than two persons who are considered to be the parent
when a third party is introduced into the assisted reproduction process).
19 Heard, supra note 7, at 928-29 (claiming that the difficulty of probating wills increases when
embryo freezing increases the length of time in which posthumous children can be born); see Martha J.
Stone, Tick... Tick ...Tick: As Biological Clocks Wind Down, the Laws Governing Inheritanceand
ParentalRights Issues Heat Up, 43 S.TEX. L. REV. 233, 244 (2001) (stating that most issues involving
ARTs addressed by courts involve inheritance and parental rights, including disagreements over the
disposition of embryos).
20 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 2008) (explaining that a child conceived through artificial
insemination "by persons duly authorized to practice medicine and with the consent in writing of the
woman and her husband, shall be deemed the legitimate, birth child of the husband and wife for all
purposes"); INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF LAWS, supra note 15, at 203 (citing N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 73); McAllister, supra note 7, at 72-73 (recounting Estate of Gordon, 501 N.Y.S.2d 969 (Sur. Ct.
1986), which gave rise to § 73 as a case raising a question as tothe inheritance rights of children
conceived by artificial insemination).
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including the legal status of a posthumously conceived child and her
inheritance rights. 2 1 This Note provides a comprehensive review of how
advances in reproductive technology have shaped the legal landscape of
New York's inheritance laws and highlights the areas of law that have not
yet been addressed. The plethora of issues raised by these various
reproductive technologies requires the New York Legislature to statutorily
address each technology individually. The analysis consists of three parts.
Part I provides an overview of several reproductive technologies and
catalogues the ways each technology implicates inheritance law. Part II
examines the ways that both New York case law and statutory law have
responded to the legal implications of these technologies. Part III reviews
the recommendations offered by the New York Task Force and the
Advisory Committee to the Surrogate's Court, highlights issues that New
York law has not yet addressed, and offers additional recommendations for
legislative reform.
I. PILLARS COLLIDE: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES IMPLICATING LAW

A.

The Reproductive Technologies

This section describes several reproductive technologies, but others have
been omitted for the sake of brevity. The technologies discussed below are
the most widely used technologies and are those that most seriously
implicate inheritance law.
22
Al was the first reproductive technology used for human reproduction.
As the oldest form of non-coital reproduction, the procedure does not
involve sexual intercourse; 23 rather it involves the artificial injection of

21 See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 178 (N.Y. 1998) (holding that pre-zygotes are not recognized
as persons for constitutional purposes, and therefore their disposition does not implicate a woman's
fundamental right to privacy or bodily integrity); see also In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207, 210 (Sur.
Ct. 2007) (concluding that posthumously conceived children born by in vitro fertilization were "issue"
and "descendants" for all trust purposes).
22 See KINDREGAN & McBRIEN I, supra note 8, at 28-29 (suggesting that the Al procedure,
originally used for animal husbandry, was adopted for human use as early as 1790); see also Anne
McLaren, Biological Aspects of A.ID., in LAW AND ETHICS OF A.I.D. AND EMBRYO TRANSFER 3, 3
(Ciba Foundation Symposium ed. 1973) (describing the scientific process of artificial insemination and
attributing its introduction to John Hunter).
23 KINDREGAN & McBRIEN 1, supranote 8, at 29 (indicating that this procedure "was used for...
human reproduction at least since 1790"); see Susan C. Stevenson-Popp, "I Have Loved You in My
Dreams": Posthumous Reproduction and the Need for Change in the Uniform ParentageAct, 52 CATH.
U.L. REV. 727, 759 n.3 (2003) (highlighting that "[a]rtificial insemination is the oldest and most
common form of assisted reproductive technology, as well as one of the easiest and least expensive
techniques").
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semen into a woman's reproductive tract.24 The semen for the procedure
can be obtained from either the woman's husband (AIH), from a donor
(AID), or from both her husband and a donor (AIDH).25 A donor providing
semen for Al may be known or anonymous. 26
The first recorded success of human insemination was performed in
1790, when a British woman was inseminated with her husband's "seed." 27
However, the first human insemination by donor was not performed until
nearly 100 years later, in the United States. 28 Since its inception, Al has
become a pervasive practice. In the U.S. alone, between 6,000 and 20,000
children are conceived by AID each year. 29 Recent estimates suggest that
in the U.S. approximately 500,000 children have been conceived through
Al, most from donor sperm. 30
In addition to the impact Al has independently made on reproduction, it
has also been implemented in other reproductive technologies including
surrogacy and embryo transfer. 31 Both surrogacy and embryo transfer
require the fertilization of a woman's egg within her body. Surrogacy
involves an arrangement between two women whereby the "surrogate" or

24 Heard, supra note 7, at 931 (explaining the Al procedure); see Artificial Bastards, TIME, Feb.
26, 1945, available at http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,792012,00.html (describing the use of
a syringe for this the Al injection).
25 Heard, supra note 7, at 932; ATHENA LIu, ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTION AND REPRODUCTIVE
RIGHTS 12 (1991). Liu refers to AIDH-the process of combining semen of a husband and a donor-as
"confused artificial insemination" (CAI); Liu further explains that this technique is typically used when
the husband is not completely sterile and also recognizes that it introduces a question of paternity. Id.
26 KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN 1, supranote 8, at 29 (noting that the names of each donor need not be
divulged); see Sherri A. Jayson, Comment, "'LovingInfertile Couple Seeks Woman Age 18-31 to Help
Have Baby. $6,500 Plus Expenses and a Gifl ": Should We Regulate the Use of Assisted Reproductive
Technologies by Older Women?, 11 ALB. L.J. SC. & TECH. 287, 291 (2001) (emphasizing that "the
donor can either be a woman's husband ... or an unknown donor").
27 See Liu, supra note 25, at 8-9 (giving a general history of Al); see also Artificial Bastards,
supra note 24 (explaining how Al was first accomplished in 1790).
28 LIU, supra note 25, at 9 (noting the first Al performed in the U.S.); see Kristin E. Koehler,
Comment, Artificial Insemination: In the Child's Best Interest?, 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 321, 334
(1996) (recognizing that "[iun 1866, Dr. J. Marion Sims was the first to perform an artificial
insemination on a woman" in the U.S.).
29 Heard, supra note 7, at 933 (indicating how many children are conceived by Al each year); see
Joan Heifetz Hollinger, From Coitus to Commerce: Legal and Social Consequences of Noncoital
Reproduction, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 865, 871 (1985) (stating that the number of "children who are
born each year as a result of AID var[ies] from 6,000 to 20,000").
30 Helene S. Shapo, Matters of Life and Death: Inheritance Consequences of Reproductive
Technologies, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1091, 1107 (1997) (noting the number of Al conceptions to date);
Gregory A. Triber, Growing Pains: Disputes Surrounding Human Reproductive Interests Stretch the
Boundariesof TraditionalLegal Concepts, 23 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 103, 140 n. 15 (1998) (highlighting
that "as many as 500,000 couples have used third-party donated gametes or preembryos to bear
children").
3! See Heard, supra note 7, at 933 (providing a general discussion of reproductive technologies);
see also Jayson, supra note 26, at 291 (illustrating that "[s]everal ART methods are currently available:
artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, cryogenic preservation, surrogacy, and fertility drugs").
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"surrogate mother" carries a child for another woman. 32 Typically, the
surrogate agrees to being artificially inseminated with a man's sperm, to
carry the child to term, and to allow the child to be subsequently adopted
33
by the "intended mother" (the sperm donor's wife or partner). This form
of surrogacy, in which the surrogate's own egg is fertilized, is known as
"traditional" surrogacy. 34 Advances in reproductive technology have also
given rise to a new form of surrogacy known as "gestational surrogacy," in
which the surrogate's egg is not used and she is therefore genetically
5
unrelated to the child.3
Embryo transfer similarly involves two women; however, in this
procedure, after the donor woman's egg is fertilized through Al using the
intended father's sperm, it is removed from her uterus and transferred into
36
the womb of the intended mother, where it is carried to term. Embryo
transfer can also be used in conjunction with "embryo adoption" whereby a
fertilized egg that is not genetically related to either intended parent is
37
implanted in the womb of the intended mother and carried to term. This
process allows fertilization to occur outside of the intended mother's body;
32 KINDREGAN & McBRIEN I, supra note 8, at 129 (defining a "surrogate" in the context of
reproductive technologies as a "woman who agrees to serve as the birth mother to have a child for
another person or couple, whether or not she is the genetic mother, and whether or not she does so for
compensation"); WARREN FREEDMAN, LEGAL ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN
REPRODUCTION: ARTIFICIAL CONCEPTION AND MODERN GENETICS 6 (1991) (suggesting that the word
"surrogate" meaning "substitute" may not be appropriate for the process, in which the surrogate mother
bears and gives birth to the child through IVF or embryo transfer).
33 Heard, supra note 7, at 933 (highlighting that "[u]sually the surrogate mother agrees to be
artificially inseminated with a man's sperm, and soon after birth, the child is adopted by the sperm
donor's wife"); KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN I, supra note 8, at 131 (emphasizing that the surrogate, as
"standard protocol," agrees "to surrender any resulting child for adoption after its birth").
34 KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN I, supra note 8, at 129 (defining traditional surrogacy); Heather Weller,
Traditionalversus GestationalSurrogacy, CHILDBIRTH SOLUTIONS,
http://www.childbirthsolutions.com/articles/preconception/surrogacy/index.php (last visited May 10,
2009) (discussing the difference between traditional surrogacy and gestational surrogacy).
35 KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN I, supra note 8, at 129-30, 132-33 (indicating that "[g]estational
surrogacy" is sometimes referred to as "IVF surrogacy" because it employs in vitro fertilization; the
procedure involves the implantation of a complete embryo into the surrogate's womb, instead of the
artificial fertilization of her own egg); Weller, supra note 34 (discussing the process of gestational
surrogacy as well as its benefits and drawbacks).
36 See Heard, supra note 7, at 934 (outlining two circumstances in which this type of embryo
transfer is used: (I) when a woman cannot produce eggs, but can carry a fetus, she may reproduce by
"prenatal adoption of a donated embryo," or (2) when a woman can produce eggs, but cannot carry a
fetus to term, she may reproduce by transferring her embryo to the womb of a "surrogate mother"); see
also American Pregnancy Association: Embryo Transfer, http://www.americanpregnancy.org/
infertility/embryotransfer.html (last visited May 10, 2009) (stating that "embryos are generally
transferred back to the woman's uterus at the two - eight cell stage, which occurs 48 - 72 hours after
the retrieval").
37 FREEDMAN, supranote 32, at 5 (noting that in this procedure a third-party woman is inseminated
with donor sperm, and once the egg is fertilized it is removed and implanted into the womb of the
intended mother for gestation and birth). See generally Embryo Adoption, http://adopting.adoption.com
/child/embryo-adoption.html (last visited May 10, 2009) (defining the process of embryo adoption).
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however, the alternative environment that is employed for fertilization here
is still a human body. 3 8
In 1969, two British doctors successfully united a human egg and sperm,
entirely outside the body, and thus completed the first human in vitro
fertilization (IVF).39 However, the first successful human birth resulting
from IVF did not occur until nearly ten years later in 1978.40 To achieve
conception through this procedure, the externally fertilized egg must be
transferred into a woman's uterus, and the embryo must be successfully
implanted into the uterine walls. 4' Though IVF requires meticulous timing
and chemical balancing, it has proven to be a fruitful alternative to
traditional procreation. 42 Indeed, since the birth of the first "test-tube
baby," 43 IVF has developed into a viable option for reproduction.44
In the U.S. in 1987, more than 1200 children were conceived by IVF,
and the statistic worldwide presently exceeds 3000.45 With the IVF
procedure becoming more advanced and its accessibility increasing, its
success rate is only expected to rise. 46 Additionally, the advances of other
38 KINDREGAN & McBRIEN I, supra note 8, at 82 (outlining the differences between various
reproductive technologies, including embryo transfer and in vitro fertilization). See generally Embryo
Adoption, supra note 37 (explaining that this process is chosen by women who want to experience
childbirth).
39 ANDREA L. BONNICKSEN, IN VITRO FERTILIZATION: BUILDING POLICY FROM LABORATORIES TO
LEGISLATURES 13 (1989) (attributing the first scientifically reported results of in vitro fertilization to
Robert Edwards and Patrick Steptoe); JENNIFER GUNNING & VERONICA ENGLISH, HUMAN IN VITRO
FERTILIZATION: A CASE STUDY IN THE REGULATION OF MEDICAL INNOVATION 3-4 (1993) (recounting
Edwards' role in developing the procedure for human IVF and the partnership that developed between
Edwards and Steptoe).
40 BONNICKSEN, supra note 39, at 17 (highlighting that "the first ongoing pregnancy from an
external fertilization" did not occur until 1978); Heard, supra note 7, at 935 (noting that "the first
successful 'test-tube baby' was born in England on July 25, 1978").
41 See McAllister, supra note 7, at 60 (explaining that the embryo is typically transferred to the
uterus at the two to sixteen cell stage); see also LIU, supra note 25, at 13 (detailing the procedure).
42 See Heard, supra note 7, at 934-35 (highlighting that since the inception of IVF, more than one
thousand babies have been born using this process). See generally KRANZ, supra note 2, at 39-40
(emphasizing that "[a] woman might be impregnated with an embryo one year, and then later, when she
was ready for a second child, be impregnated with another embryo").
43 See Heard, supra note 7, at 935 (noting the term used to describe a child conceived through in
vitro fertilization, referring to the procedure of fertilizing the egg outside the body in a Petri-dish or
"test-tube"); see also McAllister, supra note 7, at 60 (indicating that the "first 'test-tube baby' resulting
from successful IVF ... was born in England"); FREEDMAN, supra note 33, at 3 (suggesting that the
complicated medical procedure required in IVF prohibited the technology from being as popular as it
was originally expected to be).
44 As sperm banks grew into a profitable business in the 1980s, IVF procedures were used with
increasing frequency. KRANZ, supra note 2, at 39-40. "In vitro fertilization is now offered by 175
clinics in the United States, and is practiced worldwide." Heard, supranote 7, at 935-36.
45 See McAllister, supra note 7, at 60 (providing a general discussion of IVF); see also Heard,
supra note 7, at 935 (asserting that more than one thousand children have been born by IVF since the
first one was born in 1978).
46 See ROBERT H. BLANK, REGULATING REPRODUCTION 65 (1990) (reporting on the success rates
of various reproductive technologies, including IVF); see also Mary Patricia Byrn, From Right to
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techniques that incorporate IVF have expanded the potential success of the
procedure. 47
Cryopreservation is a more recent technology that not only incorporates
IVF but also is incorporated in IVF. The technology allows for the storage
48
and preservation of reproductive material through cryogenic freezing.
The process has routinely been used for the storage of sperm and embryos;
however, the field has recently experimented with cryopreservation of
unfertilized eggs.4 9 Cryopreserved gametes (sperm and eggs) can be used
in IVF to produce embryos. 50 Conversely, embryos created through IVF
can be sustained by cryopreservation and can be implanted into a woman's
womb at a later time. 5 1 The ability to collect reproductive material and
delay conception until a much later date provides an array of advantages
that may improve the success rate of IVF.52 However, the advantage
offered by cryopreservation that most seriously implicates inheritance law
53
is the potential for posthumous conception of children.

Wrong: A Critique of the 2000 Uniform ParentageAct, 16 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 163, 174-75 (2007)
(noting a dramatic increase in the success rate and number of children born through the use of IVF).
47 See KINDREGAN & McBRIEN I, supra note 8, at 82-84 (distinguishing similar ARTs from IVF);
see also KRANZ, supra note 2, at 23-24 (outlining the various analogous technologies that exist
compared to IVF).
48 See KINDREGAN & McBRIEN I, supra note 8, at 84 (giving a general description of
cryopreservation); see also McAllister, supra note 7, at 59 (explaining that semen can be frozen for use
in reproductive procedures).
49 See KtNDREGAN & McBRIEN I, supra note 8, at 84 (explaining that cryopreservation of
unfertilized eggs is still experimental); see also Keith L. Harrison et al., Oocyte Cryopreservationas an
Adjunct to the Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 2007 MED. J. AUSTL. 186, 379 (reporting successful
use of oocyte-or unfertilized egg-cryopreservation in IVF procedures).
50 See Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Maureen McBrien, Posthumous Reproduction, 39 FAM. L.Q.
579, 580 (2005) [hereinafter Kindregan & McBrien II] (discussing the potential for posthumous
conception, growing out of cryopreservation of ovum, sperm, and embryos); see also McAllister, supra
note 7, at 63 (stating that eggs and sperm can be frozen similarly to embryo cryopreservation).
51 See KINDREGAN & McBRIEN I, supra note 8, at 85 (presenting cryopreservation as a technique
for preserving embryos); see also Jill R. Gomy, The Fate of Surplus CryopreservedEmbryos: What is
the SuperiorAlternativefor their Disposition?, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 459, 463 (2004) (explaining that
cryopreserved embryos may be stored for future use in IVF).
52 See KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN I, supra note 8, at 85 (indicating that the advantages of
cryopreservation for IVF include: (1) embryos can be used during different cycles, thereby increasing
the possibility of pregnancy, (2) the potential of multiple births will be decreased because the need to
implant multiple eggs at once will be eliminated, and (3) doctors will have the time to screen embryos
for disease before implantation); see also Gomy, supra note 51, at 463-64 (listing cost savings,
emotional and physical benefits, and convenience as advantages of cryopreservation).
53 Erica Howard-Potter, Beyond Our Conception:A Look at Children Born Posthumously Through
Reproductive Technology and New York Intestacy Law, 14 BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 23, 24-26 (2005)
(addressing the possibility of having a posthumous child through cryopreservation and the subsequent
questions surrounding that child's inheritance); Kindregan & McBrien II, supra note 50, at 580-81
(asserting that new technologies, which allow posthumous conception, are giving rise to a new set of
legal issues).
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InheritanceLaw Implications

This section outlines the implications that each previously discussed
reproductive technology has on inheritance law. Because the implications
are numerous, it may be helpful to consider them within the context of
three main "umbrella" issues: (1) legal status of the child's parent(s); (2)
legal status of the child; and (3) legal status of the reproductive material.
The first of these categories concerns "legal parentage." 5 4 Family law
has defined three types of "parenthood," including biological parenthood,
legal parenthood, and social (or psychological) parenthood.55 However, the
relationship between a child and her legal parents establishes her
inheritance rights.56 The legal status of parents is relevant to determine the
rightful heirs of an intestate estate and the rightful beneficiaries to testate
estates and other gifts, including class gifts. 57 Before the introduction of
reproductive technologies, a presumption of paternity applied when a child
was born to a married woman, 58 and a presumption of maternity was
standard. 59 Traditionally, the biological mother had always been the
gestational mother (i.e., the woman who carried the child to term), and she
was presumed to be the legal parent at the child's birth.60 However, with
the advance of reproductive technologies, neither of these presumptions
54 Shapo, supranote 30, at 1100 (noting that "legal parentage establishes inheritance rights").
55 Id. at 1096 (discussing three types of parenthood under family law); see Harry D. Krause &
David D. Meyer, American Law in a Time of Global Interdependence: U.S. National Reports to the
XVIth InternationalCongress of ComparativeLaw: Section H What Family for the 21" Century?, 50
AM. J. COMP. L. 101, 114-15 (2002) (explaining the American Law Institute's desire to include the
category of "de facto parents"-another name for social or psychological parents-in the ALl
Principles).
56 Shapo, supranote 30, at 1100 (explaining that legal parentage ascertains inheritance rights); see
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-114(a), 8 U.L.A. 91 (amended 1993) (stating that "for purposes of intestate
succession by, through, or from a person, an individual is the child of his [or her] natural parents,
regardless of their marital status").
57 Shapo, supra note 30, at 1110 (asserting that legal parentage establishes those who can take
under intestate estates, family allowance statutes, and class gifts); see DOUGLAS J. CUSINE, NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNIQUES: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 59 (1988) (discussing how it is the child's legal
position which will determine whether the child has inheritance rights).
58 Shapo, supra note 30, at 1009 (explaining that the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) establishes a
rebuttable presumption that a man is the natural father of a child if he is married or attempted to marry
the mother); Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretative Approach to the
Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 883 (2000) (stating that the marital
presumption of legitimacy is the primary rule which governs the parentage of children born to a married
woman).
59 Shapo, supra note 30, at 1099-1100. The UPA reaffirms the common law assumption that the
woman who gave birth to the child is its mother. Id. The European-American tradition identifies a
child's mother through the biological act of giving birth. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U.
CHI. L. REv. 209, 253 (1995).
60 Shapo, supra note 30, at 1097 (reviewing the traditional conceptions about maternity and
paternity that are challenged by modem reproductive technologies); see Roberts, supra note 59, at 253
(noting that common law held a woman was the legal mother of the child to whom she gave birth).
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remains intact. 6 1 The discussion below highlights the various ways
different technologies challenge these presumptions.
The second category of legal implications concerns the legal status of the
child as "legitimate" or "illegitimate," which has historically been
determined by the marital status of the child's parents. 62 This distinctionstill held by many states-reflects the common law presumptions of
paternity and maternity, under which a child born to married parents is
legitimate and a child born to unmarried parents is illegitimate. 63 The
legitimacy of a child is relevant for the purposes of inheritance because it
governs her status as "child," "heir," or "issue," which in turn determines
whether she can stand as a testate or intestate beneficiary to her parents'
estates. 64 The preservation of this primitive distinction is extremely
dangerous in a society that utilizes reproductive technologies as a possible
means to conceive outside the context of the "traditional" family.65 This
issue is especially pertinent in cases of homosexual couples relying on
61 See Shapo, supra note 30, at 1097-98 (discussing generally the impact of reproductive
technologies on the legal status of both parents and the legal status of parents on inheritance rights); see
also Garrison, supra note 58, at 883 (explaining that the marital presumption of legitimacy is more
rebuttable today due to blood and DNA tests, which can disprove paternity with a high degree of
reliability).
62 CUSINE, supra note 57, at 59. In legal systems throughout the world, including in the United
States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, the legal status of a child largely depends on the
legal relationship (marital relationship) of his parents. Id. This type of regulation reflects the common
law in which illegitimate (non-marital) children possessed fewer rights than a legitimate child born to
married parents. Id. Much of the family law legal framework in the United States was based off of the
British system and then altered to meet the interests and concerns of the states. See Susan E. Dalton,
From Presumed Fathers to Lesbian Mothers: Sex Discrimination and the Legal Construction of
Parenthood, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 261, 268 (2003). British laws in the seventeenth century
demonstrate that a child's legitimacy status was originally inseparable from that of his parents. Id.
Children born out of wedlock were considered illegitimate and their parents had no legal duty to
support them. Id. at 268-69.
63 Shapo, supra note 30, at 1102 (suggesting that an absence of legislation specifically addressing
the legal status of a child born through the use of reproductive technology leaves their legal status to be
determined according to common law); see CUSINE, supra note 57, at 59 (commenting that a child was
legitimate under common law if it was born of a legally valid marriage, and such child enjoyed the
fullest rights when measured against the rights of other children).
64 See Heard, supra note 7, at 939-40 (noting that generally an illegitimate child cannot inherit
from his father under a class gift in a will made to "children" or "heirs" because, in most cases, that
class does not include illegitimate children); see also Kindregan & McBrien II, supra note 50, at 582
(explaining that while a court, when referring to a class of beneficiaries, may construe terms such as
"my issue" or "my grandchildren" as requiring a genetic relationship between the testator and child
claiming to be the beneficiary, other courts might construe such terms to include those children
conceived through assisted reproduction).
65 Kirby, supra note 1, at 4. This benefit extends to single women who wish to conceive without a
partner, unmarried couples where the male is infertile, and homosexual sexual couples who cannot get
married under state law. Id. State statutes vary in regards to whether a child born into a void or voidable
marriage is considered legitimate. See CUSINE, supra note 57, at 34. In addition, courts have also
interpreted statutes in favor of legitimizing children born into a common law marriage in a state where
such a marriage was not recognized. Id. As a result of such a liberal policy, it appears unlikely that a
court would find a child born as a result of AIH to be illegitimate. Id.
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reproductive technologies to reproduce. 6 6 Section II infra contains a more
in-depth discussion of "non-traditional" families relying on assisted
reproduction.
The third category of inheritance law implications focuses on the
treatment of reproductive material as "property." The legal understanding
of "property" typically extends not only to the physical object, but to the
"bundle of rights recognized in that object." 67 These rights include the
68
ability to control, possess, use, exclude, profit from, and dispose of assets.
Courts and legislatures have been hesitant to assign this "bundle" to the
area of reproductive control. 69 Though courts have not addressed the issue,
the question of whether reproductive materials (including sperm, eggs, and
embryos) can be inherited assumes that this material can be considered
property. 70 The discussion below illustrates the ways that several advanced
procedures raise this issue.
1.

Artificial Insemination Implicating Inheritance Laws

In discussing how Al implicates inheritance law, it is necessary to
distinguish between the three types of insemination methods-AIH
(husband), AID (donor), and AIDH (husband and donor) 7 I-because they
66 See Shapo, supra note 30, at 1124-25 (reviewing cases involving homosexual couples that have
conceived by reproductive technologies, challenging accepted notion of a "family unit"); see also
Catherine DeLair, Ethical, Moral, Economic and Legal Barriersto Assisted Reproduction Technologies
Employed by Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 147, 147-49 (2000)
(discussing how an increasing number of gay men and lesbian women who seek to bear and raise
biologically related children have been facilitated by a host of assisted reproductive technologies).
67 Barry Brown, Reconciling Property Law with Advances in Reproductive Science, 6 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 73, 74 (1995) (noting the legal definition of property); see Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 545 (2005) (explaining the concept of
a "bundle of rights").
68 See KiNDREGAN & MCBRIEN 1,supra note 8, at 65 (for a general discussion of reproductive
material as property); see also Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 67, at 546 (listing the rights of
ownership in property).
69 Brown, supra note 67, at 73-74 (discussing the reasons why courts are reluctant to apply
property rights analysis to the area of reproductive control); see Sandra B. Zellmer & Jessica Harder,
Unbundling Property in Water, 59 ALA. L. REV. 679, 724, 726-27 (noting that reproductive material is
recognized by most state legislatures as having characteristics of "quasi-property rights").
70 See Andrea Corvalan, FatherhoodAfter Death: A Legal and Ethical Analysis of Posthumous
Reproduction, 7 ALB. L.J. SCa. & TECH. 335, 338-39 (1997) (emphasizing that courts struggle with
classifying sperm as property, but recognize it as an "interim" property interest); see also James E.
Bailey, An Analytical Framework for Resolving the Issues Raised by the Interaction Between
Reproductive Technology and the Law of Inheritance, 47 DEPAuL L. REV. 743, 748 (1998) (citing
Hecht v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993)) (stating that
Hecht is the first and only case, thus far, to address the question of whether gametes can be bequeathed
or inherited); see also Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283-84 (holding that the sperm in question was part of
the decedent's estate and that it could be validly bequeathed to his wife).
71 See Heard, supra note 7, at 932 (discussing the difference between AIH and AID); see also Liu,
supra note 25, at 12 (describing the technique of AIDH, which she refers to as CAI); Steven M. Recht,
"M" is for Money: Baby M and the SurrogateMotherhood Controversy, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 1013, 1050
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each carry different legal implications. 7 2 The method carrying the fewest
legal implications is AIH. Because this variety of Al employs the
husband's sperm, the traditional "procreational unit" of man and wife is
preserved and the presumption of paternity is maintained. 73 Thus, this
procedure is essentially an alternative to sexual intercourse and, if
74
successful, it produces a child with two identifiable parents.
Conversely, AID and AIDH introduce a third-party male into the
procreation process and can therefore raise questions of paternity. 75 Under
many state statutes, including New York's, if a child is born to a married
couple by AID or AIDH, the husband will only be presumed to be the
father of the child if he consents to the procedure. 76 In either scenario, the
husband's paternity will be presumed even though he was not necessarily
the sperm donor. 77 However, if the child is born to a non-married couple by
AID, or if the husband does not consent to the AIDH procedure, the male
partner's or husband's paternity will be subject to considerations of
biological parenthood. 78 Additionally, the donor's paternity will not be cut
off and, if he demonstrates commitment to the child, his paternal rights
cannot be terminated without his consent. 79 As discussed above, the
n.31 (1988) (describing the three methods of artificial insemination: AIH, AID, and CAI).
72 See McAllister, supra note 7, at 59-60 (comparing the different reproductive technologies and
their respective legal implications); see also Liu, supra note 25, at 8-12 (explaining the three types of
At and acknowledging the legal implications arising out of each).
73 See McAllister, supra note 7, at 59. The traditional notion of "two-parent procreation" is
maintained by the method of AIH. Id. AIH produces a biological offspring from a married couple,
which poses few legal problems. Koehler, supra note 28, at 338 n.3.
74 McAllister, supra note 7, at 59 (noting that AIH procedure creates the same result as if the child
was conceived by traditional means of conception); see Recht, supra note 71, at 1050 n.31 (illustrating
how AIH facilitates the induction of the father's sperm with the mother's egg).
75 McAllister, supra note 7, at 59. The sperm donor in an AID procedure is unknown. Id. Neither
the sperm donor nor the couple knows each other in an AIDH procedure. Liu, supra note 25, at 11-12.
Determinations of paternity become difficult in both AID and AIDH procedures. Koehler, supra note
28, at 338 n.3.
76 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 2008).
77 Shapo, supra note 30, at 1097. The common law traditionally presumed the paternity of the
husband where a child was born to a married couple. Id. With the introduction of AID, in nearly every
state, the presumption is rebuttable by production of evidence that the husband is sterile or impotent. Id.
However, the courts will not overturn the presumption where "a finding of non-paternity would be
contrary to the child's best interests." Id. The New York Family Court reiterated that a strong legal
presumption exists that any child born to a married woman is presumptively the legitimate issue of her
marriage, and that the husband is the presumed legal father of such issue. Elena A. v. Judith N., 591
N.Y.S.2d 946, 948 (Fam. Ct. 1992). However, this presumption is rebuttable. Id.
78 Shapo, supra note 30, at 1097-98 (noting that paternity of a child born to an unmarried woman
has been determined by different rules under which biological parenthood of the father, once
established, may be considered more important); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261-62 (1983)
(stating that the significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an
opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring).
79 Shapo, supra note 30, at 1097-98 (emphasizing that the Supreme Court has held that an unwed
biological father has no due process rights to a hearing before his child is adopted unless he has
established a relationship with the child or with the family unit of the mother and child and has
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question of paternity is relevant because it is essential in determining from
80
whom the child can inherit in several contexts.
Because AID and AIDH both raise issues of paternity, the legitimacy of
a child conceived by either procedure may also be questioned. Under
common law, an illegitimate child was not entitled to inherit from her
father or mother because she was considered a "child of no one." 81 Most
states have moved away from the unforgiving common law and have thus
adapted their inheritance laws to treat this child as an intestate heir of her
mother, but not of her father.82 Despite the adaptation, however, the
legitimacy of a child under most state statutes still depends on the marital
status of her parents. 8 3 Unfortunately, this antiquated means of determining
legitimacy has also carried into states' Al statutes, which apply only to
children born by means of Al to married couples.84 In addition to adopting
its own Al statute, specifically addressing the legitimacy of children born
through Al, New York has also addressed the matter in case law. 85 While
these steps contribute to the protection of children conceived by Al, they do
not apply to children conceived through other reproductive technologies.
Thus, the legal status of children conceived through most reproductive
demonstrated commitment to this relationship); see Thomas v. Robin, 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div.
1994) (indicating that the paternal rights of a sperm donor were not cut off because of the relationship
he had forged with the child).
80 See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text (comparing the UPA and the Uniform Probate
Code in their treatment of Al).
81 See Shapo, supra note 30, at 1098 (noting the law regarding inheritance by nonmarital children
has changed significantly from the traditional common law); see also JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL.,
WILLS, TRUSTS & ESTATES (7th ed. 2005) (stating that although innocent of any sin or crime, children
of unmarried parents were given harsh, pitiless treatment by the common law).
82 See Shapo, supra note 30, at 1098-99 (illustrating that a child can be an heir of his or her father
if his or her parents are married and the father acknowledges paternity); see also Trimble v. Gordon,
430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977) (finding that the primary purpose of an Illinois statute is "to provide a system
of intestate succession more just to illegitimate children than the prior law, a purpose tempered by a
secondary interest in protecting against spurious claims of paternity").
83 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (indicating that new technologies have altered
presumptions concerning inheritance).
84 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 2008) (highlighting that, in New York, the statute only
applies to children born by Al to a married woman with her husband's consent, whereas the legitimacy
of a non-marital child born by Al has not been statutorily addressed); see Gotlib v. Ratsutsky, 601
N.Y.S.2d I (App. Div. 1993) (noting that where child support is sought for a child who is the product of
artificial insemination and the provisions of Section 73 are raised as a defense, the court, in ruling on
temporary child support, must make a preliminary determination as to whether there is enough merit to
the claim of paternity to warrant the imposition of child support obligations during the pendency of the
action).
85 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (stating that "[a]ny child born to a married woman by means of
artificial insemination .. . shall be deemed the legitimate, natural child of the husband and his wife");
see also Howard-Potter, supra note 53, at 63 (recognizing § 73 of New York Domestic Relations Law
(DRL), as a statute determining the legitimacy of children bom through Al, applies only to married
couples); see also Shapo, supra note 30, at 1112-25 (discussing the ways in which Al implicates
inheritance law and the ways states have responded).
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technologies still hangs in the balance.
2.

Surrogacy and Embryo Transfer Implicating Inheritance Laws

Like Al, surrogacy and embryo transfer implicate inheritance law by
establishing ambiguous legal parentage. 86 However, unlike Al, surrogacy
and embryo transfer challenge the traditional presumption of maternity
rather than paternity. 87 Traditional surrogacy, in which the surrogate is
genetically related to the child and carries the child to term, 88 creates more
of a challenge to the presumption of maternity than does gestational
surrogacy. 89 In traditional surrogacy, the surrogacy agreement entered into
can be difficult to enforce if the birth mother, who is also the child's
biological mother, decides not to surrender her parental rights. 90 When this
occurs, a custody battle generally ensues between the intended mother and
the biological surrogate mother. In gestational surrogacy, on the other
hand, neither woman is genetically related to the child but the surrogate has
the ability to claim parental rights on the grounds that she is the
"gestational" mother of the child.91
Embryo transfer resembles traditional surrogacy in that the egg is
fertilized by Al inside the donor's body.92 Thus, the egg donor is still
genetically related to the child, as she is in the traditional surrogacy
procedure. However, embryo transfer requires the fertilized egg to be
removed and implanted in the womb of the "intended" mother,9 3 so the egg
donor does not serve as the "gestational" mother. 94 It has been suggested
that the availability of alternative procedures, including embryo transfer,
may explain the limited use of surrogacy. 9 5
86 See supra notes 71-85 and accompanying text (illustrating how Al implicates inheritance law).
87 See KINDREGAN & McBRIEN I, supra note 8, at 132 (providing a general discussion of
surrogacy); see also McAllister, supranote 7, at 88-91 (discussing whether the "gestational mother, the
genetic mother, or both are to be recognized as parents").
88 See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (commenting on traditional surrogacy).
89 See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing gestational surrogacy).
90 See KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN I, supra note 8, at 132 (discussing the reasons for the decrease in
use of traditional surrogacy); see also Shapo, supra note 30, at 1101-05 (explaining the ways
reproductive technologies have impacted the "traditional family").
91 See KINDREGAN & McBRIEN 1,supra note 8, at 132-33 (providing a general discussion of
surrogacy); see also McAllister, supra note 7, at 88-91 (noting the difference between "gestational" and
"genetic" motherhood and the parental ties that are associated with each; the gestational mother is the
woman who carries the child to term and actually gives birth to the child; the genetic mother is the
woman whose egg was fertilized to create the child).
92 See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text (discussing surrogacy).
93 See supra note 36 and accompanying text (describing embryo transfer).
94 Id.
95 See KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN I, supra note 8, at 132 (stating that increased use of IVF and
embryo transfer have made gestational surrogacy more practical); see also Shapo, supra note 30, at
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Procedures like surrogacy and embryo transfer have made the
determination of the maternal rights of a woman as crucial to inheritance
laws as determining paternal rights of a man.9 6 Thus, these two procedures
implicate inheritance by severely complicating the determination of the
legal status of the child's mother in allowing a gestational mother to be
genetically unrelated to the child to whom she gives birth.97 Next to Al,
surrogacy is the only other reproductive technology that has been
specifically addressed by the New York Legislature. Perhaps the most
prominent effect of New York's surrogacy legislation is the prohibition of
surrogacy contracts under Section 122 of the Domestic Relations Law
(DRL), which states that surrogacy contracts are "contrary to the public
policy" of New York State and are thus unenforceable. 9 8 Despite this
prohibition, it remains necessary to consider the ways surrogacy implicates
inheritance law because the procedure is generally lawful when it is not
part of a compensation agreement. Part II and III infra will further
examine the unique legal problems raised by these techniques, and how
they have or have not been addressed under New York law.
3.

IVF Implicating Inheritance Laws

Like all of the above reproductive technologies, IVF implicates
inheritance law by allowing a departure from traditional parental
relationships. 99 However, IVF not only divorces sex from reproduction (as
other technologies do), but it also divorces conception from birth and
genetic contribution from gestation.' 0 0 Thus, the nature of the procedurel0'
02
creates a potential for numerous genetic and gestational combinations:1
1106 (providing a general discussion of Al).
96 See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text (emphasizing the significance of determining a
child's legal parents when using reproductive technology because parentage establishes inheritance
rights); see also Christine A. Djalleta, A Twinkle in a Decedent's Eye: Proposed Amendments to the
Uniform Probate Code in Light of New Reproductive Technology, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 335, 344-45
(1994) (discussing the difficulties in determining parentage using new reproductive technologies and
the importance of this determination on inheritance).
97 See Liu, supra note 25, at 15-16 (showing the number of biological links that a child, born
through surrogacy, may have); see also Nicole L. Cucci, Constitutional Implications of In Vitro
FertilizationProcedures,72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 417, 444 (1998) (noting that a child conceived through
reproductive technology could have as many as five parents).
98 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 2008).
99 See McAllister, supra note 7, at 62 (stating that either the donor or the recipient may be the
intended mother in IvF); see also Shapo, supra note 30, at 1194-95 (hypothesizing that all parties
involved could be recognized as legal parents in an IVF situation).
100 Shapo, supra note 30, at 1131 (stating that IVF, like other reproductive technologies, allows for
pregnancy to occur without using traditional means); McAllister, supra note 7, at 60-61 (describing
how a successful pregnancy is achieved through IVF absent traditional methods).
101 See supranotes 38-44 and accompanying text (describing the process involved in IVF).
102 Shapo, supra note 30, at 1130 (stating IVF can occur using a combination of contributors);
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(1) the egg and sperm may come from the "intended"103 parents; (2) either
the egg or the sperm, alone, may be donated; (3) all reproductive material
may be donated by persons other than the "intended" parents, and then the
fertilized embryo can be implanted in either (a) the "intended" mother's
womb, or (b) the womb of a surrogate.104 Clearly, IVF can introduce
numerous legal complications where donated reproductive material is used
along with a gestational surrogate105 Given the sheer number of parties
that may be involved, IVF is probably the procedure that most seriously
challenges the traditional notions of both "mother" and "father."1 06
The other significant legal implication arising out of IVF concerns the
question of whether a property interest can exist in reproductive
material. 107 Because the IVF procedure unites reproductive material
outside the body, it raises the question of "who 'owns' fertilized
embryos."1 08 This question generally arises in the context of disposing of
extracorporeal embryos that are created through IVF.109 The unique Hecht
case is the only case to date recognizing gametes as property that may be
bequeathed.l10 However,

statutory law has not yet recognized

any

Cucci, supra note 97, at 444 (listing the five possible people that can be involved in the 1VF process).
103 See supra note 33 and accompanying text (defining the "intended mother" as the sperm donor's
wife or partner).
104 See FREEDMAN, supra note 32, at 43 (discussing how reproductive technologies-including
IVF-have changed the traditional parental relationship, stating "[i]t is already possible for a child to
have five different 'parents': (1) the woman who donated the egg; (2) the man who donated the sperm;
(3) the woman to whose uterus the fertilized embryo is transferred so that she can carry it to birth; (4)
and (5) the man and woman who will receive and presumably raise the child"); see also McAllister,
supra note 7, at 62 (listing examples of combinations of genetic donors in IVF).
105 Shapo, supra note 30, at 1131 (stating that IVF becomes more legally complicated when
genetic material is used from multiple sources); McAllister, supra note 7, at 62 (noting that the legal
relationship can become complicated because, in addition to using a gestational mother, the sperm can
come from any source, including a third party).
106 See Shapo, supra note 30, at 1130-31 (explaining the various combinations arising from IVF
and the implications of each); see also Cucci, supra note 98, at 444 (describing the number of parental
relationships that can occur from IVF).
107 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (discussing inheritance issues among nontraditional families); see also Charles M. Jordan, Jr. & Casey J. Price, First Moore, Then Hecht: Isn't it
Time We Recognize a PropertyInterest in Tissues, Cells, and Gametes?, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
151, 153 (2002) (noting the legal definition of property-material to which the law has extended the
entire "bundle" of property rights).
108 MARCIA MOBILIA BOUMIL, LAW, ETHICS AND REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE 10 (1994) (emphasis
added) (introducing this question in the context of explaining that "[t]he wife sought 'custody' on the
basis that she was unable to have any children except through IVF"); see Jordan & Price, supra note
107, at 153 (addressing the legal question raised through reproductive technologies-whether a person
has a legal claim to his or her reproductive tissues and cells once it has been separated from his or her
body).
109 See Shapo, supra note 30, at 1142 (discussing the issue that surrounds the disposal of fertilized
embryos); see also Jessica Berg, Owning Persons: The Application of Property Theory To Embryos and
Fetuses, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 159, 165-66 (2005) (outlining the issues of discarding and freezing
embryos).
110 Hecht v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993). For a
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reproductive material as personal property.111 This issue frequently arises
in the context of reproductive technologies where cryopreservation is
united with IVF, creating the potential for fertilized embryos and gametes
2
to outlive one or both of their genetic donors. "1
4.

Cryopreservation Implicating Inheritance

Cryopreservation, as a newer reproductive technology, raises two
general issues with respect to inheritance: (1) whether frozen gametes or
embryos, to which a decedent has genetically contributed, can be
considered part of the decedent's estate at the time of his death; and (2)
whether children born from frozen reproductive material, and conceived
after the genetic parent's death, have a right to inherit from the deceased
parent's estate.' 13 Within the scope of these two general issues, inheritance
law is implicated in a number of different ways.114 Also, because the
technique is commonly used in conjunction with other techniques like
IVF,115 cryopreservation raises the legal implications associated with those
procedures as well. 116
The question within the first of these two issues is whether embryos
created by IVF that are cryogenically frozen 117 can be bequeathed as part
discussion of Hecht as the first case involving reproductive technology, see supra note 70.
111 See Jordan & Price, supra note 107, at 153 (expressing whether a person makes a legal claim to
his tissue and cells); see also Jennifer Long Collins, Hecht v. Superior Court: Recognizing A Property
Right In Reproductive Material, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 661, 663 (1995) (summarizing the case
history leading up to Hecht).
112 Jordan & Price, supra note 107, at 153. In the article, First Moore, Then Hecht: Isn't It Time
We Recognize a Property Interest in Tissues, Cells and Gametes?, the authors recognize that "if the
gamete is not considered an interest in property, the donor's interest in the gamete expires at death and
thus makes any passage to and use of the gametes by a surviving third party impossible." Id. Given the
short viability of reproductive material outside the body, only cryogenically preserved reproductive
material could really ever be bequeathed. Id. See also Collins, supranote 111, at 674.
113 See Shapo, supra note 30, at 1142 (reviewing the inheritance issues created by new
reproductive technology); see also Joshua Greenfield, Dad was Born a Thousand Years Ago? An
Examination of Post-Mortem Conception and Inheritance, with a Focus on the Rule Against
Perpetuities, 8 MiNN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 277, 278-79 (presenting issues that deal with inheritance and
cyropreservation).
114 See Shapo, supra note 30, at 1148-58 (outlining different ways in which inheritance law is
linked to reproductive technology); see also Greenfield, supra note 113, at 277-89 (depicting the
inheritance law issues linked to cyropreservation).
115 IVF and cryopreservation are often used in conjunction because of the ways in which they
supplement each other. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
116 For example, if an embryo created by IVF is cryogenically frozen, the problems of parental
ambiguity and child legitimacy that accompany IVF will follow that embryo. See McAllister, supra
note 7, at 63. The problems are also seen when dealing with inheritance laws. Shapo, supra note 30, at
1149-53.
117 See Jordan & Price, supra note 107, at 152-53. This is the terminology used to refer to the
method employed in cryopreservation. Id. A cryopreservation contract was signed by a husband and
wife when they cryogenically preserved embryos they had created using their gametes. See Angela K.
Upchurch, The Deep Freeze: A Critical Examination of the Resolution of Frozen Embryo Disputes
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of the donor's estate. 11 8 This inquiry is relevant for the purposes of
inheritance because frozen reproductive material can possibly survive its
biological progenitors. 1' 9 If an embryo is left and its progenitors do not
direct its disposition after their death, the executor of the estate will be left
to decide the embryo's disposition. 120 Because an embryo is the product of
the combination of reproductive material from two donors, undirected
disposition of an embryo would require an executor to sever the donors'
individual interests. 12 1 Thus, because gametes are the reproductive material
of only one human, it may be slightly easier for an executor to determine
their disposition without direction.1 22 However, inherited gametes can be
involved in posthumous conception; 123 thus, it is necessary to determine
whether gametes can be inheritable material as well.
The second general inheritance implication raised by cryopreservation is
rooted in the inheritance rights of "posthumously conceived" 124 children.
Through the AdversarialProcess, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 395, 396 (2005).
118 See Jordan & Price, supra note 107, at 153 (acknowledging the need for the law to come to a
conclusion about how to treat frozen gametes upon the producer's death); see also Shapo, supra note
30, at 1148-51 (discussing the possibility of embryos as inheritable property).
119 See KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN I, supra note 8, at 87 (asserting that the ability of a frozen embryo
to survive its progenitors provokes questions relating to postmortem reproduction and the effects it may
have on inheritance); see also McAllister, supra note 7, at 63 (noting the potential of long-term survival
of cryogenically preserved embryos and the subsequent possibility of a child being born well after the
death of its genetic parents).
120 See Berg, supra note 109, at 163 (stating that in situations in which general property law
concepts will be applied to embryos, they should be treated just as any other piece of personal
property); see also Shapo, supra note 30, at 1151-52 (comparing the consequences of not specifically
directing the postmortem disposition of embryos with the consequences of not specifically directing the
postmortem disposition of gametes).
121 See Shapo, supra note 30, at 1151 (observing the difficulty that would result if one donor died
and did not bequeath his interest in the embryo to the other donor); see also Upchurch, supra note 117,
at 407-08 (pointing to disagreements about whether the rights of individual donors to an embryo should
be considered jointly or in their capacity as individuals).
122 See Michael K. Elliott, Tales of Parenthood From the Crypt: The Predicament of the
Posthumously Conceived Child, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 47, 50 (2004). Legislatures must decide
how to treat the inheritance rights of posthumous children because of the ability to store gametes and
embryos for extended periods of time. Id. The question of ownership as applied to gametes is not nearly
as complicated as it is applied to embryos, because gametes are derived from a single progenitor,
whereas an embryo is the production of two gamete donors. See Shapo, supra note 30, at 1147-51.
Additionally, several states are more concerned with the protection of embryos because they possess the
potential to develop into a person, whereas gametes are incapable of such development. Id. at 1147-51.
However, the question of whether gametes alone may be bequeathed is relevant to posthumous
conception and, therefore, must be determined. Id. at 1153. The procreative rights model is an approach
used to determine how the rights in and to embryos shall be divided by weighing the interests of each
donor and finding who has the greater constitutionally protected interest. See Upchurch, supra note 117,
at 411.
123 See Elliott, supra note 122, at 48 (declaring that both men and women can freeze gametes,
which can be used to produce a child even after the gamete donor has died); see also Shapo, supra note
30, at 1148 (referring to the Hecht case where the decedent testator bequeathed several vials of his
frozen sperm to his companion, Deborah Hecht; further providing that if she desired, he wished for her
to use the frozen sperm to conceive a child after his death).
124 KINDREGAN & McBRIEN I, supra note 8, at 219-20. "Posthumously conceived" is a term used
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The question of whether a posthumously conceived child is legitimate is
inherent to this larger inquiry because her legitimacy will be considered in
determining her inheritance rights.125 This issue applies to inheritance
rights of posthumously conceived children under both intestate and testate
dispositions of property.126 Under New York's intestacy statute, the general
rule is that a distributee must survive the testator (i.e., must be living at the
time of the testator's death) in order to inherit.127 The statute specifically
includes children in gestation at the time of testator's death but
subsequently born alive, otherwise known as children "a ventre sa mer," as
persons alive at the time of testator's death.128 However, due to the
specificity of this requirement, a posthumously conceived child would not
be entitled to an intestate share because she would not qualify as "issue," or
as an "adopted child."129
Within the realm of testamentary disposition, the ability of a
posthumously conceived child to inherit is relevant on several levels.1 30
First, a posthumously conceived child may be excluded from a class of
beneficiaries-named in the testamentary instrument of her deceased
genetic parent-such as a class of "heirs," "children," or "issue." 131
Though several states have expressly recognized posthumously conceived
children as legitimate, the majority of states have not yet addressed the
issue. 132 Therefore, in order to assure that posthumously conceived
to describe children born of frozen reproductive material after the death of one or both of its genetic
parents, which is sometimes replaced with "postmortem;" however, the former will be used throughout
this Note. Id. See Kristine S. Knaplund, Equal Protection, Postmortem, Conception, and Intestacy, 53
U. KAN. L. REv. 627 (2005); see also Margaret Ward Scott, Comment, A Look at the Rights and
Entitlements of Posthumously Conceived Children: No Surefire Way to Tame the Reproductive Wild
West, 52 EMORY L.J. 963 (2003).
125 See Heard, supranote 7, at 939-40 (noting that illegitimate children are often not considered a
part of the class when a will names "children," "heirs," or "issue"); see also Knaplund, supra note 124,
at 631-32 (pointing out that a postmortem child faces difficulties when attempting to establish a right to
inheritance from a biological parent who was deceased when he was conceived).
126 See Shapo, supra note 30, at 1155-58 (discussing the possibilities of both a testate decedent
and an intestate decedent with a posthumously conceived child succeeding him); see also Scott, supra
note 124, at 972-74 (observing the problems that arise when a posthumously conceived child seeks to
inherit from the deceased parent when there is a will and when there is not a will).
127 See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1 (McKinney 2008).
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 See Heard, supra note 7, at 939-51 (outlining the ways in which cryopreservation implicates
testate disposition); see also Brianne M. Star, A Matter of Life and Death:Posthumous Conception, 64
LA. L. REV. 613, 615-19 (2004) (highlighting the relevance surrounding such an inheritance in a
testamentary disposition).
131 Heard, supra note 7, at 939-40. Under the laws of probate an illegitimate child is excluded
from a class of "heirs," "issue," or "children." Id. "Historically, an illegitimate child could not take in
intestacy from a deceased parent and was not included in a testamentary gift .... " Stacey Sutton, The
Real SexualRevolution: Posthumously Conceived Children, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 857, 915 (1999).
132 See KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN 1,supra note 50, at 588. The states that have expressly defined
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children will not be excluded from class gifts directed towards any of the
33
above groups, attorneys must draft wills with greater specificity.1
Second, the right of a posthumously conceived child to inherit from her
deceased progenitor(s) may complicate the application of a state's antilapse statute. 134 New York's anti-lapse statute, Estates, Powers and Trusts
Law (EPTL) Section 3-3.3, applies where a child named as a beneficiary
predeceases the testator. 135 Under the statute, gifts to certain predeceased
beneficiaries pass to the issue of that beneficiary.136 For example, a gift to
the testator's child who predeceased the testator will pass to the children of
the predeceased child, who are also the grandchildren of the testator. Thus,
the normal application of this statute would be challenged if a
posthumously conceived child were born to the predeceased beneficiary,
1
years after the testator had died. 37
Third, the right of a posthumously conceived child to inherit from her
deceased genetic parent may cause certain bequests to violate the common
law rule against perpetuities.1 38 The rule against perpetuities states "no
interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years
after some life in being at the creation of the interest." 139 A class gift is
considered vested only when the "interest of every member is fixed and
ascertained;" 1 4 0 the mere possibility that another member may qualify for
the class at a later date may prevent the gift from vesting.141 Thus, the

the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children by statute include California, Colorado,
Delaware, Florida, North Dakota, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. Id. Several other states
have adopted or are considering the most recent version of the UPA (revised in 2002), which
specifically addresses posthumous parentage in the context of assisted reproduction. Id. The majority of
states continue to deny posthumously conceived children legal status and inheritance rights. See Star,
supra note 130, at 613.
133 See Heard, supra note 7, at 939-41 (noting the importance of unambiguously stipulating the
testator's expressed intent); see also Star, supra note 130, at 617 (stating that courts will generally not
interfere with a testator's clear intent when enforcing a testamentary disposition).
134 See Heard, supra note 7, at 951 (emphasizing that the "[a]pplication of the anti-lapse statute
could prove difficult if long after the estate has been settled, a freeze-thaw child of the deceased
beneficiary is born"); see also Susan N. Gary, Posthumously Conceived Heirs, 19 APR PROB. & PROP.
32, 38 (2005) (suggesting that lawyers should be cognizant of the potential dilemma presented by the
anti-lapse statute under such situations).
135 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.3 (McKinney 2008).
136 Id.
137 See id. (lacking a provision addressing this situation).
138 See Heard, supra note 7, at 941-44 (positing the potential problems posthumous children
present under the rule against perpetuities); see also Shapo, supra note 30, at 1156 (stating the inclusion
of postmortem children in class gifts could violate the rule against perpetuities).
139 Heard, supra note 7, at 941 (quoting GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (3d ed. 1915)).
140 Id.
at 942.
141 Heard, supra note 7, at 942 (arguing the possibility of children born years after death could
prevent vesting past the twenty-one year perpetuities period); see Shapo, supra note 30, at 1156
(opining that the estate could remain open to allow postmortem children's interests to vest).
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inclusion of a posthumously conceived child as a member of the class can
delay vesting beyond the time the rule allows, causing the gift to violate the
rule and to become void. 142 However, where the "rule of convenience"1 4 3
applies to allow the class to artificially close when there are no intervening
interests and where at least one person qualifies as a member of the class,
this problem can be avoided. Unfortunately, the rule of convenience can
only apply to close a class once the gift can be distributed (i.e., when at
least one member of the named class already exists). 144
Fourth, and finally, the inheritance rights of a posthumously conceived
child can disrupt the application of a state's "after-born" statute, which
establishes the inheritance rights of children born after the decedent
executes his will. 145 However, this issue does not arise for posthumously
conceived children of decedents whose wills are executed according to
New York inheritance law.146 Both of New York's inheritance statutes
addressing after-born children exclude posthumously conceived children
through their precise language.
Under N.Y. EPTL Section 2-1.3,
posthumously conceived children are expressly excluded from the class of
"children conceived before, but born alive after such disposition becomes
effective," referring to the disposition of decedent's estate. 14 7 Additionally,
through a 2007 amendment, the definition of "after-born" child under N.Y.
EPTL Section 5-3.2 was adjusted to include only "child[ren] of the testator
born during the testator's lifetime or in gestation at the time of testator's
death and born thereafter."1 48

142 Heard, supra note 7, at 942 (noting new reproductive technologies can create potential
violations of the rule against perpetuities); see Shapo, supra note 30, at 1156 (including postmortem
children creates problems with the rule against perpetuities).
143 LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON
WILLS TRUSTS AND FUTURE INTERESTS 18-42 (4th ed. 2006) (stating that "a class gifl that has not yet
closed physiologically closes to future entrants on the distribution date if a beneficiary of the class gift
is then entitled to distribution").
144 WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 143, at 18-42 (commenting that once the class closes due to
convenience, no subsequently adopted or conceived persons can enter the class); see Jesse Dukeminier,
A Modern Guide to Perpetuities, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1867, 1892 (1986) (discussing the two ways in which
a class can close).
145 WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 143, at 18-41 (explaining that new reproductive technologies
have destroyed the notion that children cannot be conceived after a parent's death); see Cindy L. Steeb,
A Child Conceived After His Father's Death?: Posthumous Reproduction and Inheritance Rights. An
Analysis of Ohio Statutes, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 137, 159 (2000) (stating that posthumous children
complicate statutory schemes).
146 See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.3 (McKinney 2008) (omitting a provision
concerning after-born children).
147 Id.
148 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-3.2 (McKinney 2008).
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II. A TANGO

WITH TECHNOLOGY: NEW YORK'S RESPONSE TO
INHERITANCE LAW IMPLICATIONS

This section examines the ways in which New York statutory and case
law have or have not responded to the implications outlined above.
Because several of the mentioned inheritance issues are raised by multiple
technologies, and by the conjunction technologies (i.e., those techniques
that employ more than one ART), this section is organized by issue rather
than by technology. For example, many of the issues addressed below are
raised in cases involving the use of artificial insemination; however, the
same issues may arise in conjunction with other technologies and can likely
be resolved in a similar manner.
A.

DeterminingLegal Parentage

As illustrated above, the issue of legal parentage frequently arises with
respect to technologies that introduce a third party, such as a donor or a
surrogate, into the procreative process.149 The question of parenthood
where assisted reproduction is involved must be resolved to protect the
child from the "potential legal handicaps" she might face.150 Though legal
parenthood is essential to determining a child's legitimacy and her
subsequent inheritance rights,151 it is relevant to consider the legal
determination of parenthood independently as a foundation. The two main
sub-issues within the larger question of legal parentage pertain to: (i)
defining who among the group of a child's gestational, biological, and
social parents, are her legal parents; and (ii) adapting the traditional rules of
52
parenthood to "non-traditional" parents.]

149 See supraPart I (illustrating that this issue frequently arises in cases of AID, IVF where a donor
is involved, surrogacy, and embryo transfer).
150 Liu, supra note 25, at 79 (emphasizing that, for example, "the deliberate creation of a child
whose position is subject to legal and social discrepancies and is inferior to that of a child conceived
naturally, may render the use of artificial reproductive techniques socially and morally unacceptable");
see Malina Coleman, Gestation, Intent, and the Seed: Defining Motherhood in the Era of Assisted
Human Reproduction, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 497, 529 (1996) (highlighting that "traditional approaches
protect
to defining parenthood are inadequate in the era of assisted human reproduction[;]" thus "[tlo
the child produced by such procedures ... there must be procedures in place which guarantee to the
greatest extent possible that the decision to contribute one's reproductive function was freely made after
careful deliberation").
151 See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing the problems that homosexual couples
face).
152 See Shapo, supra note 30, at 1101-05 (discussing the ways reproductive technologies have
impacted the "traditional family"); see also John E. Durkin, Reproductive Technology and the New
Family: Recognizing the Other Mother, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 327, 337 (1994)
(indicating that "[aldvances in reproductive technology ... offer expanded opportunities for women
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1. Determining Paternity: "Who's Your Daddy?"
Because of the numerous rights and obligations that are tied to
fatherhood, its determination has been a legal issue since English common
law reigned supreme. 153 Many of the traditions of paternity determination
have remained;1 54 however, reproductive technologies have called for
exceptions to be made under modem law. For example, the antiquated
presumption that the husband of a married woman is the legal father of a
child born to her is still honored today.155 However, where a child is
conceived through AID or AIDH, a married man can rebut the presumption
of his paternity. 156 Previously, the only evidence that could rebut the
paternity presumption was that the man was away from his wife at the
approximate time of conception, or that he was sterile or impotent.157
Additionally, the development of reproductive technologies has made it
more difficult for courts to rely upon biology as a means of determining
legal paternity for children born to unmarried women. 158 The cases below
are examples of ways the New York courts have determined paternity
where reproductive technologies are involved.

who... want to have children outside the traditional rubric of the nuclear family").
153 See Shapo, supra note 30, at 1097 (stating that the presumption that existed under the common
law of England is still in existence); see also Stephen A. Sherman, You Ain't My Baby Daddy: The
Problem of PaternityFraud and Paternity Laws, 5 AvE MARIA L. REv. 273, 275 (2007) (noting that
"the common law utilized the 'presumption of paternity' doctrine").
154 Shapo, supra note 30, at 1097. As under English common law, paternity determination for a
marital child differs from that of a non-marital child. Id. The purpose behind the common law was "to
clarify whose duty it was to care" for children bom into a lawful marriage. Sherman, supra note 153, at
275-76.
155 Shapo, supra note 30, at 1097 (stressing that the presumption about paternity that arose in the
common law of England still plays a role today). But see Sherman, supra note 153, at 274 (indicating
that "modem courts have begun to abandon such an approach ... [which] is a positive step ... but
moving too far will result in negative effects").
156 Shapo, supranote 30, at 1097 (illustrating that the presumption can be rebutted by showing that
"the husband is sterile or impotent or a blood test evidencing that the child could not be his"); Sherman,
supra note 153, at 276 (highlighting that "[i]f the husband could prove impossibility, then the
presumption could be successfully rebutted").
157 See Howard-Potter, supra note 53, at 29 (outlining the problems with the common law
presumptions of paternity in light of the advances in reproductive technology); see also Laurence J.
McDuff, The "Inconceivable" Case of Tierce v. Ellis, 46 ALA. L. REv. 231, 233 (1994) (describing the
old ways a paternity presumption may be rebutted).
158 Howard-Potter, supra note 53, at 29. Determining paternity of a child born to an unmarried
woman has been governed by rules that hold biological parenthood as an important factor. Id.
Typically, there is no legal issue as to the genetic father's liability. McAllister, supra note 7, at 92.
However, this method of determining fatherhood, known as the genetic mode has proven unsatisfactory
in cases of reproductive assistance. Liu, supra note 25, at 74-75. Because many reproductive
technologies allow a donor contributing his or her reproductive material for the creation of an embryo,
the determination of parenthood on biological grounds is no longer fool proof. Id. Rather, the genetic
mode of determination must incorporate a consideration of the biological parent(s)' intent to serve as a
reliable method of determining fatherhood. Id. at 75-76.
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New York Case Law Addressing the Question of Paternity Where
Assisted Reproduction is Involved

In early cases, where paternity of a child conceived through AID was
challenged, either support obligations were imposed on the husband or
visitation was granted to him, but the child was not typically recognized as
his legitimate offspring.159 However, in 1958, in the case of Abajian v.
Dennett,160 the New York Supreme Court estopped a woman from denying
the paternity of her former husband, which she attempted to do on the
ground that the child was born to her through artificial insemination.16 1 The
court ruled in favor of the former husband, who sought continuance of
custody and visitation rights pursuant to a separation agreement he entered
into with the respondent.162 The agreement was incorporated into a Nevada
163
state divorce decree to which the court granted full faith and credit.
In 1994, New York courts addressed the same question of paternity
raised in Dennett within a very different context; however, the outcome
mirrored that of the 1958 case. In Thomas v. Robin, 164 the petitioner sperm
donor sought an order of filiation and rights to visit his biological daughter,
who was being raised by the respondent and her lesbian partner.165 The
parties orally agreed that the petitioner's contact with the child would be
limited during the early years of her life; however, once the child reached
the age of five, respondent consented to the petitioner having significantly
more contact with his daughter.166 Eventually, petitioner revealed to
respondent his desire to establish a parental relationship with the child and
respondent and her partner believed this violated the terms of their oral
agreement.1 6 7 The court disagreed, estopping the respondent from denying
the petitioner parental rights to his daughter on the grounds that respondent
initiated and encouraged the contact between petitioner and the child and
upon evidence of the petitioner's commitment to the child.168
159 McAllister, supra note 7, at 71 (engaging in a historical analysis of cases dealing with the
paternity of children born by AID, and reflecting upon the early response of the court to this question);
Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 411-12 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (discussing the requirements of a father
for support when he has induced the women to go through with AID).
160 184 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
161 Id. at 180.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994).
165 Id. at 358.
166 Id. at 357-58. The parties agreed that petitioner would not call or send presents during the first
three years of Ry's (the child's) life. Id.
167 Id. at 358.
168 Id. at 362 (holding that the relationship the petitioner established with the child was sufficient
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b. New York Statutes Addressing the Question of Paternity Where
Assisted Reproduction is Involved
Though the New York Legislature has not completely resolved the
question of paternity in all situations where a reproductive technology is
employed, it has addressed the issue in the case of surrogacy.169 Section
11 1(b) of the DRL expressly allows for the determination of paternity by a
surrogate.170 However, it requires that the determination be made in
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Family Court Act except that
the surrogate has no power to grant any relief relating to the support of the
child.171 Section 121 of the DRL, also applying to surrogacy contracts,
defines the "genetic father" as the "man who provides sperm for the birth
of a child born pursuant to a surrogate parenting contract."1 72 These
statutes resolve the issue of paternity in cases of surrogacy.
In addition to these sections of the DRL, other New York paternity
statutes that are not specifically keyed to reproductive technology
occasionally apply. For example, under N.Y. EPTL Section 4-1.2(a)(2),1 73
if the father of a non-marital child can establish his paternity by one of the
methods outlined in this provision, his child will be legitimate and will be
able to inherit from him.17 4 This statute is relevant to the inheritance rights
of children conceived through reproductive technologies because some of
them are also non-marital children.175 In this manner, other New York
to justify his parental rights to the child).
169 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 11 (b), 122, 124 (McKinney 2008). These sections define the
paternity rights of a "genetic father" with respect to a child born pursuant to a surrogate parenting
contract, although such contracts are void and unenforceable in New York. Id.
170 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 11 l(b)(1) (specifying that a surrogate has jurisdiction to determine
issue of paternity in adoption proceedings).
171 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § II l(b)(2); see N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 516(a), 571(a) (McKinney 2008)
(indicating that New York allows for the determination of paternity through a written acknowledgement
of paternity that is legitimized by the court).
172 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 121(2) (McKinney 2008).
173 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2(a)(2) (McKinney 2008) (delineating the right of a
non-marital child under inheritance laws of New York, providing that paternity has been acknowledged
by the father).
174 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2. Under the statute, a non-marital child is the
legitimate child of his father so that he and his issue can inherit from his father and his paternal kindred
if: (A) A court of competent jurisdiction has issued an order of filiation declaring paternity, or (B) the
father has signed an appropriately executed instrument acknowledging paternity, or (C) paternity has
been established by clear and convincing evidence and the father openly and notoriously acknowledged
the child as his own, or (D) a blood genetic marker test had been administered to the father which
together with other evidence establishes paternity by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
175 See Howard-Potter,supranote 53, at 55-56 (considering the inheritance rights of posthumously
conceived children as non-marital children, under this statute); see also Ilene Sherwyn Cooper,
Posthumous Paternity Testing: A Proposal to Amend EPTL 4-1.2(a)(2)(D), 69 ALB. L. REv. 947, 949
(2006) (arguing that posthumously conceived children, considered as non-marital children, may be
largely deprived of their inheritance rights under this statute).
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statutes generally concerning legitimacy may also be relevant to
determining paternity of children born by way of reproductive technology.
2.

Determining Maternity: "Are You My Mother?"

Unlike paternity, which was subject to the court's determination even
before the advent of reproductive technology,1 76 maternity was typically
presumed to vest in the woman who gave birth to the child.177 The rationale
behind the differential treatment for male and female parenthood was that a
woman could become pregnant by any man, but she could not give birth to
a child that was not her own. 17 8 As discussed above, this presumption is no
longer intact because advances in reproductive technologies allow genetic
and gestational motherhood to be split between two distinct women.1 79 The
case and statutes below illustrate New York's response to the challenges
facing the maternity presumption.
a.

New York Case Law Addressing the Question of Maternity
Where Assisted Reproduction is Involved

The question of maternity in cases of assisted reproduction can arise
where conception is achieved using donated eggs.180 In the case of
McDonald v. McDonaldl8l--one of the only New York cases dealing with

176 See supra Part II.A. (discussing reproductive technology and the effect that it has had in the
legal arena).
177 See Howard-Potter, supra note 53, at 30 (outlining the problems with the common law
presumptions of maternity in light of the advances in reproductive technology); see also Mary Lynne
Birck, Modern Reproductive Technology and Motherhood: The Search for Common Ground and the
Recognition of Difference, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 1623, 1646 (highlighting that the common law never
questioned the definition of maternity, believing that maternity was "easy to define both legally and
socially-there was never a question that the birth mother was the child's natural mother").
178 Howard-Potter, supra note 53, at 30 (explaining that the common law presumptions of
maternity were based on the woman's physical inability to give birth to a child that is not biologically
related to her); see also Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood,40
UCLA L. REV. 637, 673 (explaining that the traditional concept that a woman was a mother stemmed
from "the simultaneity of biological and social motherhood," and that the separation of biological and
social motherhood through reproductive technology "threatens traditional understandings of
'mother"').
179 See McAllister, supra note 7, at 88-91 (discussing the difference between "gestational" and
"genetic" motherhood and the parental ties that are associated with each); see also Shapo, supra note
30, at 1096-1101 (discussing generally the impact of reproductive technologies on the legal status of
both parents and the legal status of parents on inheritance rights).
180 See Shapo, supra note 30, at 1137-38 (noting that "the gestational woman would be the
presumed mother," which would mean "the child might inherit from the sperm donor.., but not from
the egg donor to the same embryo"); see also Krista Sirola, Comment, Are You My Mother? Defending
the Rights of Intended Parentsin GestationalSurrogacy Arrangements in Pennsylvania, 14 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 131, 156 (arguing that Pennsylvania's surrogacy statute should resemble the
UPA by abandoning the doctrine of presumption and recognize intended parents).
181 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (App. Div. 1994).
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a child conceived by IVF with egg donation-the court departed from the
traditional presumption of maternity.182 Because New York does not have
IVF statutes, the court was left to determine this issue on its own. 183 The
plaintiff-husband in this case moved for "sole custody of the infant issue"
on the grounds that he was the "only genetic parent available."1 84 The court
determined that either a genetic or a gestational connection was sufficient
to establish a mother-child relationship, but that maternity should be
determined by the parties' intent where the two roles did not coincide in
one woman. 185 Thus, the court held the defendant-wife (the child's
gestational mother) to be the "natural mother" of the child in question and
granted her temporary custody. 186
b. New York Statutes Addressing the Question of Maternity Where
Assisted Reproduction is Involved
Though new challenges facing the maternity presumption are numerous,
the statutes that address them are few in number. The New York statutes
that are most relevant to this issue are the corresponding maternity
provisions in the above-mentioned paternity statutes. Section 121(2) of the
DRL, for example, defines "birth mother" as the "woman who gives birth
to a child pursuant to a surrogate parenting contract." 18 7 Section 121(3)
defines a "genetic mother" as a "woman who provides an ovum for the
88
birth of a child born pursuant to a surrogate parenting contract."1
However, given the impact of surrogacy on the common law presumption
of maternity, two additional sections of the DRL, Sections 122 and 123,
require recognition because they respectively deem surrogacy contracts to
89
be against public policy and prohibited under New York law.1
182 See Howard-Potter, supra note 53, at 30 (noting that the presumption that someone other than
the woman who gave birth could be the mother of the child was inconceivable before the use of ARTs);
see also Shapo, supra note 30, at 1138 (reviewing McDonald, asserting that the court determined
maternity based on the parties' intent as opposed to applying the presumption of maternity).
183 See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 178-79 (N.Y. 1998) (citing authorities in other jurisdictions
as well as law review articles to deal with a New York IVF custody dispute because of a lack of
relevant state statutes); see also Shapo, supra note 30, at 1138 (noting that plaintiff relied on the a
California case since New York did not have an IVF statute).
184 McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 479.
185 Id. at 480 (quoting Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84, 104 (1993) (Kennard, J., dissenting)). The
court recognized that the use of reproductive technology in this case effectively divided the "two
aspects of the female role in reproduction," (i.e. the genetic and gestational) between two women. Id.
The court determined that the woman who intended to "bring about the birth of a child... [and] to raise
as her own" is the "natural mother" of the child. Id. at 479-80.
186 McDonald,608 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
187 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 121(2) (McKinney 2008).
188 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW§ 121(3).

189 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 2008) (explaining that surrogate parenting

2009]

BIRTH OFA NEWAGE

Additionally, under Section 4-1.2(a)(1) of the EPTL, a non-marital child is
considered "the legitimate child of his mother so that he and his issue
inherit from his mother and from his maternal kindred." 190 Thus, questions
of maternity arising in cases employing reproductive technologies, other
than surrogacy, will require the court's determination.
3.

The "Non-Traditional" Family

The so-called "traditional family," which Anglo-American law has
historically protected,191 is centered upon the cohabitation and procreation
between a married man and woman. 192 Reproductive technologies have
challenged this tradition by allowing procreation to occur outside of the
marital union, outside of the male-female union, and even outside of the
human body.193 The law has resisted recognizing alternative family units in
favor of protecting the "institution of marriage" and the best interests of
children.194 However, as these technologies continue to advance and to
grow in popularity, the traditional concept of family is forced to adapt.195
The cases and statutes below reflect the ways in which New York's

contracts are void, contrary to public policy, and unenforceable); see also N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 123
(McKinney 2008) (explaining the punishment for forming or assisting in the formation of a surrogate
parenting contract for money).
190 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2(a)(1) (McKinney 2008).
191 See KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN I, supra note 8, at I (explaining why and how the "traditional
family" was protected under Anglo-American law through statutes that governed marriage); see also
Barbara J. Cox, Alternative Families: Obtaining Traditional Family Benefits Through Litigation,
Legislation and Collective Bargaining, 15 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 93, 93 (2000) (emphasizing that "[o]ver
time, [the traditional family] has obtained far-reaching legal protections and societal benefits").
192 See Kirby, supra note 1, at 4 (reviewing the history of family law in the context of considering
how the law has changed to accommodate non-traditional families); see also Cox, supra note 191, at 93
("[T]raditional families most frequently are nuclear families consisting of the husband, the wife, and
their dependent children.").
193 See Kirby, supra note 1, at 4 (citing changes in procreative unions, such as homosexual
parenting and in vitro pregnancies); see also KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN I, supra note 8, at 8-10 (listing
the numerous possibly non-traditional families that can arise from the use of assisted reproduction).
194 Siobhan Morrissey, The New Neighbors: Domestic Relations Law Struggles to Catch Up with
Changes in Family Life, 88 A.B.A. J. 36, 36 (2002). "[N]ew family structures are reshaping traditional
views.... But rethinking domestic relations law is likely to be a lengthy, contentious process." Id. The
rationale behind protecting the traditional family is rooted in two propositions. KINDREGAN &
MCBRIEN 1,supra note 8, at 5. The first is that the "institution of marriage provides the important legal
and normative link between heterosexual intercourse and procreation on the one hand and family
responsibilities on the other." Id. (quoting Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955
(Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting)). The second proposition is that a child's interest is best served in
being conceived and raised in a heterosexual marital family. Id.
195 See McAllister, supra note 7, at 111-12 (prognosticating potential adaptations in the Uniform
Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act (USCACA) as reproductive technologies further
develop); see also Emily Stark, Comment, Born to No Mother: In Re Roberto D.B. and Equal
Protectionfor GestationalSurrogates Rebutting Maternity, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 283,
296-97 (2008) (noting that courts grapple with the concept of family when dealing with reproductive
advancements).
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conception of the traditional family has adapted thus far.
a.

New York Case Law Addressing the "Non-Traditional" Family
and Assisted Reproduction

Because many instances of reproductive assistance involve nontraditional families comprised of various combinations of biological
parents, social parents, and gestational parents, adoption rights are very
relevant to cases involving reproductive technology. 196 The case In re
Jacob'97 played a pivotal role in determining the parental rights of a
parent's unmarried partner. 198 The court held that an "unmarried partner of
a child's biological mother, whether heterosexual or homosexual, who is
raising the child together with the biological parent," is entitled to adopt
under DRL Section 110.199 The court reasoned that deciding otherwise
would mean "thousands of New York [c]hildren... raised in homes
headed by two unmarried persons" would be prevented from having two
legal parents. 200 Given the vast number of non-traditional families who
procreate via reproductive technology, this decision is especially
pertinent.2 01
The case of Karin T. v. Michael T.202 also involved a non-traditional
family, but unlike Jacob, it involved a member of the couple trying to
avoid parental responsibilities, rather trying to acquire them. 20 3 The
196 See Shapo, supra note 30, at 1126-29 (discussing instances of reproductive technology in
which adoption may be desired or needed and may be complicated by the non-traditional nature of the
family in question); see also Valerie L. Baker, Surrogacy Legislation in California:One Physician 's
View of the Role of Law, 28 U.S.F. L. REv. 603, 603-04 (1994) (likening surrogacy scenarios to
adoption because the social parent is not the biological parent).
197 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995).
198 Id. at 398 (asserting that the right of a single person to adopt under DRL § 110 extends to the
right of unmarried partners, both homosexual and heterosexual, of the biological mother of a child, to
adopt).
199 Id.; see N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 121(2) (McKinney 2008) (providing a definition for "genetic
father").
200 In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 398 (N.Y. 1995).
201 See Shapo, supra note 30, at 1127 (suggesting that the court recognized the realities of a large
number of non-traditional families in deciding to interpret these adoption statutes broadly); see also
Rachel Alyson Meltzer, Creating Family-Sensitive Schools, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 87, 87 (2005)
(stating that 25,000 babies are born through IVF each year).
202 484 N.Y.S.2d 780, 781 (Fain. Ct. 1985) (detailing the unorthodox union between a lesbian and
a transgendered woman that entered into a relationship and decided to marry and birth children); see
New, supra note 16, at 773 (recounting the non-traditional familial structure of two lesbians, a child
produced through in vitro fertilization of one of the women's ovum, and their joint interests in the
child).
203 See Karin T., 484 N.Y.S.2d at 782 (recognizing that the New York DRL has limited ability to
determine all the obligations and responsibilities of the female respondent regarding the child created
during the supposed marriage to the female petitioner); see also Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d
501, 502 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (referencing a same-sex marriage in which one party claimed the marriage was
void with no accompanying responsibilities while the other party sought child support for the children

2009]

BIRTH OFA NEWA GE

respondent was a female, who attempted to change her feminine identity so
that she could, instead, live as a man. 204 While respondent was living as a
man, respondent married the petitioner and consented to having children by
artificial insemination. 205 Petitioner later averred that she was not a parent;
therefore she was not responsible for supporting the children on the
grounds that she was not biologically related to them and had not legally
adopted them. 206 Relying on Black's Law Dictionary's definition of
"parent," 207 the court held that the petitioner was indeed a "parent" and
referred the case to the Hearing Examiner to determine the level of support
the she could be responsible for.2 08
b. New York Statutes Addressing the "Non-Traditional" Family and
Assisted Reproduction
The state legislature has not expressly addressed the issues surrounding
legal rights within the context of non-traditional families; however, as with
paternity and maternity, other New York statutes are relevant. Because of
the nature of non-traditional families, the non-marital child statute, N.Y.
EPTL Section 4-1.2, is relevant here. 209 Additionally, the New York
born before and during the marriage).
204 See Karin T., 484 N.Y.S.2d at 781 (noting respondent's dissatisfaction with her biological
female identity and her decision to change her gender by acquiring a man's name, dressing like a man,
and obtaining so-called man's work); see also Kimberly P. Carr, Comment, Alison D. v. Virginia M.:
Neglecting The Best Interests of the Child in a Non-TraditionalFamily, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1021, 1021
(1992) (recognizing that a legally married husband and wife and children born within the confines of
that marriage do not represent all contemporary familial structures).
205 See Karin T, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 781 (detailing the evolution of the petitioner's and respondent's
same-sex marriage and later child bearing); see also Laurence C. Nolan, Legal Strangers and The Duty
of Support: Beyond The Biological Tie--But How Far Beyond the Marital Tie?, 41 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 1, 17-18 (2000) (referencing the lesbian relationship between Karin T. and Michael T. and the two
children they had via artificial insemination of Karin T.).
206 See Karin T, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 784 (identifying the respondent's attempt to escape a child
support liability on the grounds that she was not the biological or adoptive parent of the petitioner's
children); see also J.C. v. C.T., 711 N.Y.S.2d 295, 296 (Fam. Ct. 2000) (highlighting that a respondent
who lacks a biological or adoptive relationship to children that petitioner produced during the parties'
same-sex marriage leaves the respondent without standing to claim parental rights over the children).
207 See Karin T., 484 N.Y.S.2d at 784 (reciting the definition of "parent" to be "one who
procreates, begets or brings forth offspring"); see also BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1190 (3d ed.
1969) (defining parent as "the father or mother" without necessitating a biological relationship).
208 See Karin T, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 784 (referring to the court's holding which determined the
petitioner was a "parent" to respondent's biological child for child support purposes); see also Caroline
P. Blair, Note, It's More Than a One-Night Stand: Why a Promise to Parent Should Obligate a Former
Lesbian Partnerto Pay Child Support in the Absence of a Statutory Requirement, 39 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 465, 469 (asserting there is no statutory definition for the term parent, yet courts generally
determine parenthood based on a biological or adoptive status with the child).
209 See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney 2008) (determining that a nonmarital child is still legitimately born to its mother and father, and thus, the child may inherit from its
mother, its maternal kindred, its father, and its paternal kindred); see also supra notes 164-68, 181-86,
and accompanying text (pointing to Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356, 356 (App. Div. 1994)
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adoption statutes, considered in In re Jacob,2 10 are appropriately
considered in the context of non-traditional families. Specifically, Section
2
110 of the DRL,211 and the Jacob court's interpretation of the statute, 12
which expanded the right of children born by reproductive technologies to
have two legal parents, may be considered. 2 13 Section 110, in conjunction
with Section 117(1)(b) and (c) of the DRL, establishes the rights of an
adopted child, who was born by reproductive technology, to inherit from
2
both his birth parent(s) and his adoptive parent(s). 14
B. Legal Status of Children Conceived Through Assisted Reproduction
1.

Legitimacy of the Child Generally

New York law regulating a child's legal status still maintains a vestige of
the common law in that it grants "illegitimate" (non-marital) children fewer
rights than legitimate children.2 15 The advance of reproductive
technologies-specifically AID-has challenged this method of
determining legitimacy by making it possible for a non-marital child to be
born to a marital couple with the help of a donor's contribution. 2 16 As
and McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 478-79 (App. Div. 1994), since both cases entail a
respondent father's use of his legal paternity to gain parental rights to a child birthed by a lesbian
petitioner).
210 660 N.E.2d 397, 398 (N.Y. 1995) (demonstrating that the court permits unmarried individuals
and homosexual individuals to adopt the children of their partner because such adoptions are consistent
with New York's adoption laws). But see Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501, 725-26 (2008)
(illustrating a homosexual respondent who did not adopt the petitioner's children, causing subsequent
ambiguity about the respondent's child support legal obligations).
211 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 110 (McKinney 2008) (specifying the parties who may adopt a
child, indicating an unmarried person or married couple may adopt a child, and noting a separated
spouse may continue with an existing foster care placement for the purpose of adoption). But see Debra
H. v. Janice R., No. 106569/08, 2008 N.Y. MiSC. LEXIS 6367, at *6 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 2, 2008) (displaying
an unmarried lesbian's desire and legal ability to adopt the child of her lesbian partner).
212 See supra note 198-201 and accompanying text (demonstrating how courts are interpreting the
DRL broadly to reflect changes in the family and how, as a result, adoptive parents are treated much the
same as birth parents under the law).
213 See supra note 200 and accompanying text. In In re Jacob an adult unmarried person that
conceives a child through artificial insemination using an unknown sperm donor qualifies as a parent
under the DRL. Id.
214 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 110 (describing how once an adoption proceeding is finalized, the
adoptive parent acquires all the rights and responsibilities of a parent, including those related to
inheritance); see also N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117 (McKinney 2008) (stating that once a child has been
legally adopted, he or she has inheritance rights from his adoptive parents and, under special
enumerated circumstances, can retain inheritance rights from his birthparents).
215 See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney 2008) (discussing the rights of
children born of a marital relationship as opposed to those rights of children not born of a marital
relationship); see also CuSINE, supra note 57, at 59 (referring to states, like New York, that have
maintained the archaic tradition of treating non-marital children as illegitimate children, granting them
fewer rights).
216 See Heard, supra note 7, at 939-40 (discussing the ways in which a child conceived by
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discussed, New York inheritance law now specifically addresses the
inheritance rights of a child born by AID,217 but, before this statute was
passed, New York courts wrestled with this question of legitimacy. The
cases below reflect the varying responses.
a.

New York Case Law Addressing Child Legitimacy Where
Assisted Reproduction is Involved

Even after the notion that AID constituted adultery was abandoned,
courts still disputed the legal status of a child born by the technique.218 In
1948, the New York Supreme Court decided Strnad v. Strnad,2 19 holding
that a child conceived by AID, where the husband had consented, was not
an illegitimate child.220 In making its decision, the court drew an analogy
between this child born by assisted reproduction and a "child born out of
wedlock" who is made legitimate by the "marriage of the interested
parties." 22 1 Additionally, the court here likened this child to one who has
been "potentially" or "semi" adopted by the consenting husband. 222
Nearly twenty years later, despite further advances made in science, the
law took a large step backwards when the Strnad decision was rejected by
another New York case. 223 In Gursky v. Gursky, 224 the New York Supreme
Court held, contrary to Strnad, that a child who is conceived through AID
is not the legitimate issue of the husband, even if the husband consents. 225
In deciding this way, the court considered the concept, "deeply imbedded
reproductive assistance could be considered illegitimate and be deprived of his inheritance rights); see
also Hagood v. Hagood, 186 S.W. 220, 225 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) (explaining that in order to be
considered a class, individuals must be able to be designated by the same general name, such as
"children," "brothers," or "sisters").
217 See Shapo, supranote 30, at 1112 (describing inheritance law as it applies to a child conceived
through AID); see also N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 2008) (stating that any child born via Al
is legitimate).
218 Karin Mika & Bonnie Hurst, One Way to be Born? Legislative Inaction and the Posthumous
Child, 79 MARQ. L. REv. 993, 998 (1996) (explaining that courts have disputed the status of children
conceived through AID, sometimes calling them "adopted" or "semi-adopted"); see also Stmad v.
Stmad, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390, 392 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (concluding that the court will not rule on property rights
concerning children born via Al-the better forums for those issues are sociology, morality, and
religion).
219 78 N.Y.S.2d 390.
220 Id. at 392 (holding that if the husband did not consent to the AID procedure the child was not
legitimate).
221

Id.

222 Id. at 391-92.
223 See Mika & Hurst, supra note 218, at 998 (recognizing the decision in Gursky v. Gursky, 242
N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963) as rejecting the Strnad decision); see also Kelly L. Frey, New
Reproductive Technologies: The Legal Problem and a Solution, 49 TENN. L. REv. 303, 314 (1982)
(noting the different conclusions reached by the courts in Strnadand Gursky).
224 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
225 Id. at 411.
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in the law," that "a child who is begotten through a father who is not the
mother's husband is deemed to be illegitimate." 226 Furthermore, the court
asserted that the decision in Strnad was not supported by legal
precedent. 227
After Gursky, New York adopted a more progressive approach to a child
born by AID through a decision by the New York Surrogate's court. 228 In
In re Adoption ofAnonymous, 2 29 the court expressly rejected the reasoning

of the Gursky court, asserting that the "historical concept" that the court
relied upon was developed long before the advent of AID.230 Instead, this
court relied upon New York's "strong policy in favor of legitimacy" and
held that a "child born by consensual AID during a valid marriage is a
legitimate child entitled to the rights and privileges of a naturally conceived
child of the same marriage." 23 1
b.

New York Statutes Addressing Child Legitimacy Where Assisted
Reproduction is Involved

Both the non-marital children statute2 32 and the New York adoption laws
under the DRL233 are relevant to determining the legitimacy of children
conceived through reproductive technology. These statutes are especially
helpful in determining legitimacy of children conceived by assisted
methods of reproduction other than AID. The legitimacy of a child born by
AID, to a married woman, is expressly determined in Section 73 of the
DRL234 (adopted in 1974, just one year after In Re Anonymous). 23 5 The
statute sets forth that such child "shall be deemed the legitimate, birth child
of the husband and his wife for all purposes." 236 The broad language of this
statute allows an inference to be drawn about the inheritance rights of these
children.2 37 However, Section 73 applies only to children born by AID to a
226 Id. at 408.
227 Id. at 410-11 (stating that the court in Strnadhad no legal precedent to support its decision).
228 See Mika & Hurst, supra note 218, at 998-99 (reviewing the case of In Re Adoption of
Anonymous, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sur. Ct. 1973)); see also Joseph Silvoso, Artificial Insemination: A
Legislative Remedy, 3 W. ST. U. L. REV. 48, 60 (1975) (noting the more forward-thinking approach of
the In Re Adoption ofAnonymous court).
229 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sur. Ct. 1973).
230 Id. at 434.
231 Id. at 435-36.
232 See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney 2008).
233 Supra notes 211,214 and accompanying text (discussing DRL §§ 110, 117).
234 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 2008).
235 In reMartin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207, 208-09 (Sur. Ct. 2007).
236 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW

§ 73.

237 Id. Under the statute, the child is deemed the legitimate and natural child of the husband and
wife "for all purposes." Id. The inheritance laws of New York allow a "legitimate" child to inherit from
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married woman. 238 Thus, alternative statutory and decisional law must be
used to determine the legitimacy and inheritance rights of non-marital
children conceived through AID.
Child as Testate Beneficiary or Beneficiary of Inter Vivos Transfer

2.

Despite the number of New York cases addressing legal status of
children born by reproductive technology, and the legal status of their
parents, 239 the question of their inheritance rights is still independently
disputed. In terms of statutory inheritance, New York statutes only address
the inheritance rights of children born to married couples by AID.240 Thus,
the New York courts have been left to determine issues of inheritance
involving children born through every other reproductive technology, at
least until the Legislature responds.
a.

New York Case Law Addressing a Child Conceived Through
Assisted Reproduction as Testate Beneficiary or Beneficiary of
Inter Vivos Transfer

In 1986, the New York Surrogate's court decided Estate of Gordon,24 1 in
which a fiduciary sought to exclude two children born to a married couple
by AID as contingent remaindermen of testamentary trusts. 242 Relying on
244
the New York AID statute, DRL Section 73,243 and the In re Anonymous
decision, the court concluded that the children objectants were "issue of
decedent's son" at the time of their births.245
Continuing the trend of legitimizing children conceived by assisted
246
reproduction, in 2005, the New York Surrogate decided In re Doe.
his or her mother, father, maternal kindred, or paternal kindred. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 41.2 (McKinney 2008). Thus, the right to inherit can be included as part of the child's legitimacy "for all
purposes." N.Y DOM. REL. LAW § 73.
238 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73.
239 See generally supra Parts II.A. and II.B. and accompanying notes (discussing case history).
240 See supra notes 218-31 and accompanying text (commenting on case history in the AID
context); see also N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 ("Any child born to a married woman by means of
artificial insemination ... shall be deemed the legitimate, birth child of the husband and his wife for all
purposes.").
241 501 N.Y.S.2d 969 (Sur. Ct. 1986).
242 Id. at 970.
243 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (establishing that a child born to a married woman by AID, with the
consent of her husband, is a legitimate and natural child of the husband and wife for all purposes).
244 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sur. Ct. 1973) (holding that a child born of consensual AID during a
legitimate marriage is a legitimate child entitled to the rights and privileges of a naturally conceived
child of the same marriage).
245 Gordon, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 971.
246 793 N.Y.S.2d 878 (Sur. Ct. 2005) (determining that children conceived by surrogacy were not
adopted and, thus, not excluded from benefits of trust via an adoption exclusion written into the trusts.)
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Trustees sought construction of an inter vivos trust by the court to
determine the eligibility of children born pursuant to a surrogacy agreement
from an egg fertilized with the settlor's son-in-law's sperm as beneficiaries
to the trust. 24 7 Though the settlor expressly provided that adopted children
should not be recognized as beneficiaries, the court held that this
specification did not call for the exclusion of children born by all
reproductive technologies. 248 Though surrogacy contracts are prohibited in
New York under the DRL,249 the enforcement of the contract was not at
issue here.
In July of 2007, the New York Surrogate's court again addressed the
question of whether children born out of assisted reproduction can
participate as beneficiaries to an inter vivos trust, but this time it considered
the rights of a posthumously conceived child.250 In In Re Martin B.,251 the
Surrogate recognized the legitimacy of a child conceived by IVF using
cryopreserved sperm of the decedent's son and asserted that the child
qualified as "issue" and "descendants" in the context of an inter vivos trust
agreement. 252 In so deciding, the Surrogate applied the rationale of In re
Anonymous and that of Section 73 of the DRL, "if an individual considers a
child to be his or her own, society through its laws should do so as well." 25 3
Though the decision of Martin B. is critical to establishing the rights of
posthumous children, Surrogate Roth's discussion of the lacking legislative
response in this area of the law is perhaps even more valuable. The bulk of
Surrogate Roth's decision focuses on the lack of legislation in New York
and the District of Colombia that addresses the status of post-conceived
children and on the existence of such statutes in other states. 254 Roth
247 Id. at 879.
248 Id. at 881 (expressing that the language of the trust, excluding adopted children, was not
intended to exclude all non-blood relations, nor was it intended to exclude children born by assisted
reproduction).
249 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 2008) (declaring surrogate parenting contracts contrary
to the public policy of the state).
250 See supra notes 124-48 and accompanying text (discussing cryopreservation and the issues
surrounding posthumous conception of a child).
251 841 N.Y.S.2d 207 (Sur. Ct. 2007). In the case of Martin B., trustees brought an action to
determine whether children conceived through IVF using cryopreserved sperm of the grantor's son
could be included in a class of "issue" or "descendents" named in a trust. Id.
252 Id. at 211-12.
253 Id. at 211.
254 See id. (noting that certain jurisdictions' legislatures, unlike those in New York and the District
of Columbia, directly address the inheritance rights of post-conceived children); see also Robert
Matthew Harper, Dead Hand Problem: Why New York's Estates, Powers and Trusts Law Should Be
Amended to Treat Posthumously Conceived Children as Decedents' Issue and Descendants, 21
QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J., 267, 293 (2008) ("Considering the antiquated manner in which the EPTL
addresses the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children, the New York Legislature must
act to amend New York's statute.").
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recognized Louisiana, California, and Florida, as the three states expressly
addressing the question with their own legislation, and acknowledged the
other seven states that have adopted the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA).
Though the laws differ among states, generally a post-conceived child is
allowed to inherit where there is consent (from one or both parents) to its
2 55
conception after death, or the child is expressly provided for in the will.
Additionally, both the Louisiana statute and the California statute limit the
time after the donor's death that this post-conceived child may be born.256
Surrogate Roth therefore concluded that the existing laws around the
country illustrate the need for "comprehensive legislation" to address and
2 57
resolve issues raised "by advances in biotechnology."
b.

New York Statutes Addressing a Child Conceived Through
Assisted Reproduction as Testate Beneficiary or Beneficiary of
Inter Vivos Transfer

Like her right to stand as an intestate beneficiary, the right of a child
conceived by assisted reproduction to stand as a testate beneficiary, or as a
beneficiary of an inter vivos trust, is primarily determined by her
legitimacy and the legal status of her parents. 258 However, some New York
statutes regarding the testamentary distribution of property also apply to
255 In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d at 210. Louisiana Civil Code § 9:391.1 provides that a postconceived child may inherit from his father if the father consented in writing to the wife's use of his
semen and the child was born within three years of the father's death. Id. The statute also allows a
person adversely affected to challenge paternity within one year of the child's birth. Id. Similarly,
California Probate Code § 249.5 states that a post-conceived child may inherit if the deceased parent
consented in writing to the posthumous use of genetic material and designated a person to control its
use. Id. Such designee must be given written notice of the designation and the child must have been
conceived within two years of decedent's death. Id. Florida's Annotated Statute § 742.17 allows a postconceived child to inherit only if the deceased parent explicitly provided for such child under his or her
will. Id. at 211. The statue also requires a written agreement by the couple and the treating physician for
the disposition of the couple's eggs or semen in the event of death or divorce. Id. However, New
Hampshire's Revised Statutes Annotated § 561:1 has been interpreted to mean that a child born via
artificial insemination after her father's death, despite the father's explicit consent to have his daughter
be recognized as his child by the "fullest extent of the law," is ineligible to inherit from her father as his
surviving issue. Eng Khabbaz v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 930 A.2d 1180, 1182-84 (N.H. 2007).
256 In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d at 210 (noting that Louisiana requires that the child be bom
within three years of the decedent's death and California requires that the child be born within two
years of the decedent's death); see Harper, supranote 254, at 273-74 (stating that, according to § 2.5 of
the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers, "an individual is the child of
his or her genetic parents," so long as certain conditions are met, including that "a posthumously
conceived child 'must be bom within a reasonable time after the decedent's death in circumstances
indicating that the decedent would have approved of the child's right to inherit' (emphasis added)).
257 In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d at 212.
258 See supra notes 239-45 and accompanying text (discussing the rights of children born by
assisted reproduction); see also Laura WW. v. Peter WW., 856 N.Y.S.2d 258, 261 (App. Div. 2008)
(noting that DRL § 73 allows "married couples who utilize AID to have a child with assurances that the
child will be, for all purposes, considered the legitimate child of both the woman and her husband").
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children born by assisted reproduction.
Sections 2-1.3259 and 5-3.2260 of the N.Y. EPTL are two relevant New
York statutes addressing this issue. The former denotes the rights of
adopted children, children born after the will was executed, and nonmarital children, to be considered as part of a class of "issue," "children,"
"descendants," "heirs," "heirs at law," "next of kin," and "distributees,"
unless the creator expresses a contrary intention. 261 Given that children
conceived by assisted reproduction can fall into any or all of the classes
expressly included under this statute, the statute is relevant to defining their
inheritance rights. The latter of the two statutes, directing the treatment of
a child born after the creation of a will,262 mainly affects children
conceived by IVF using cryopreserved reproductive material. The 2007
amendment to Section 5-3.2(a)(2)(b), previously discussed, effectively
excludes any posthumously conceived children from the class protected
under the statute.
3.

Child Concevied by Assisted Reproduction as Intestate Beneficiary

To date New York courts have not expressly addressed the rights of a
child born by assisted reproduction as an intestate beneficiary. These rights
are predominantly tied to the New York intestacy statute, EPTL Section 41.1,263 and the defmitions honored by the EPTL.264 Section 4-1.1 allows
the "issue" of a decedent to participate as intestate beneficiaries. 265 The
term "issue," as applied in the EPTL, is defined in Section 1-2.10 as the
"descendants in any degree from a common ancestor," including "adopted
children." 266 Thus, again, this child's intestate inheritance rights are
directly tied to his legitimacy and the legal status of his parents. 2 67
Therefore, all of the statutes relevant to determining the child's legitimacy
are relevant here, including: DRL Sections 73, 110, 11 (b), 124, 122, and
259 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.3 (McKinney 2008) (addressing the rights of adopted
children and posthumous children as members of a class).
260 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-3.2 (McKinney 2008) (directing the treatment of a child
bom after the execution of a will).
261 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.3.
262 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-3.2.
263 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1 (McKinney 2008) (presenting the fact that
distributing to "issue" is amongst the scenarios for distribution of an intestate estate).
264 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 1-2.10 (McKinney 2008) (defining "issue" as
"descendants in any degree from a common ancestor" that "includ[es] adopted children").
265 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1.
266 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 1-2.10.
267 See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney 2008) (stating the rules for
inheritance by non-marital children).
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EPTL Section 4-1.2.268
C. Inheritanceof Reproductive Material
1. Ownership of Reproductive Materials
Though several states have adopted statutes addressing the disposition of
stored/preserved embryos, New York has not. Additionally, New York
decisional law on the issue is limited and evolving slowly. 2 69 However, the
state's courts have addressed the issue on a few occasions.
a.

New York Case Law Addressing Ownership of Reproductive
Materials

A very early case involving IVF presents this ownership question as a
peripheral issue. In Del Zio v. PresbyterianHospital,270 plaintiffs sued the
defendant doctor for terminating their IVF procedure without their
consent.27 1 In addition to a claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, plaintiffs brought a conversion claim against the defendants for the
272
destruction of their "property" (i.e., the wife's ova that were destroyed).
Although the jury found in favor of the defendant on the conversion claim,
.this is a very early example of the conception of reproductive material as
legal property.
In 1998, the New York Court of Appeals was faced with its first property
dispute over frozen pre-zygotes produced by IVF, in the case of Kass v.
Kass.273 The divorced appellant, Maureen Kass, sought sole custody of five
cryopreserved pre-zygotes that were produced during the couple's
marriage. 274 The parties previously entered into an agreement stating that
the pre-zygotes in question would be donated to an IVF program for
research purposes. 275 Judge Kaye's decision in this case mirrors Surrogate
Roth's decision in Martin B.276 in the way that it considers existing law and
268 See generally supra notes 169-238 and accompanying text. Essentially all of the statutes that
have been addressed above as relevant to determining the legal status of a child or his parents are
peripherally relevant to a child's right to stand as an intestate beneficiary.
269 Id. (discussing the progress of New York decisional law regarding ownership of reproduction
materials).
270 No. 74 Civ. 3588, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14450 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1978) (dealing with the
issue of property rights of reproductive material).
271 Id. at *3.
272 Id. at* 10-11.
273 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
274 Id. at 177.
275 Id. at 175.
276 See generally supra notes 218-31 and accompanying text (discussing Strnadand Gursky).
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recommendations surrounding the issue. However, Judge Kaye did not call
for legislation to resolve the issue, nor did she herself outline the
appropriate means of disposition for reproductive material. 277 Instead, the
Court of Appeals merely affirmed the Appellate Division, holding that the
parties' agreement directing the donation of these pre-zygotes controlled
rather than expressly deciding whether or not the material should be
considered property. 2 78
b. New York Statutes Addressing Ownership of Reproductive
Materials
Because this issue is derived from cryopreservation-one of the newest
reproductive technologies-the New York Legislature has not addressed
this issue in the any statute.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS

A.

InstitutionalRecommendations

Though the task is daunting for any legislature to address the rights of
children born out of such modem and complex procedures, the state has
been given more than Surrogate Roth's recommendation for
"comprehensive legislation" 279 to work from. Both the New York State
Task Force on Life and Law 280 and the Advisory Committee on
Surrogate's Court of New York 281 have proffered legislative
recommendations to the state.
1.

The New York State Task Force on Life and Law

In 1985, the Task Force provided an extensive set of recommendations
for the Legislature, covering numerous issues arising out of reproductive

277 See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 174 (choosing instead to issue a holding without a call for legislative
reform).
278 Id. at 180 (holding that the informed consents signed by the parties sufficiently manifested their
mutual intention to donate the pre-zygotes).
279 See supra note 259-62 and accompanying text (including adopted children in the intestate
scheme and addressing the rights of adopted children and posthumous children as members of a class in
the New York Estates, Trusts, and Powers Law); see also supra note 85 and accompanying text (noting
that § 73 of the DRL already recognizes the rights of certain children born through artificial
insemination).
280 NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, ASSISTED
TECHNOLOGIES: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY (1998).

REPRODUCTIVE

281 2007 N.Y. Sess. Laws A-391-92 (McKinney) (presenting the Advisory Committee on
Surrogate's Court's proposed amendment to DRL § 73).
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technologies. 282 The suggestions include regulatory recommendations
pertaining to certification and licensing, embryo donation, donor screening,
counseling and informing of children, along with other matters. 283
However, for the purposes of this Note, only the Task Force's
recommendations pertaining to legal parentage and the disposition of
frozen embryos are discussed.
The Task Force recognizes that "[e]xisting New York law provides little
guidance for determining the parental rights and responsibilities of
individuals who participate in assisted reproductive procedures." 284 As a
remedy, the Task Force outlined paternity guidelines where a child is
conceived with donor sperm and maternity guidelines where egg donation
is required. 285 The recommendation for determining paternity exactly
mirrors the current DRL Section 73:286 It suggests that when a child
conceived by donor sperm is born to a married woman, her husband should
be considered the legal father if he has consented to the procedure. 28 7 The
recommendation as to maternity is that a "woman who gives birth to a child
should be considered the child's legal mother, even if the child was not
conceived with the woman's egg." 288 Consistent with this premise, the
Task Force suggests that both the genetic mother and the surrogate should
have standing as "a biological parent" to seek custody and rights to the
child. 289

On the other side of this equation, the Task Force outlined instances of
parental rights and responsibilities being relinquished or nonexistent. It
suggested that parental rights and responsibilities should be relinquished at
the time of donation of sperm, eggs, and embryos. 2 90 Additionally, the
282

See generally NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, supra note 280, at 445.

These recommendations apply to issues arising out of artificial insemination, IVF, embryo transfer, and
cryopreservation. Id.
283 See id. at 448-51 (noting that the recommendations to the existing New York regulations will
help to clarify the application of the regulations to the use of donor eggs and embryos).
284 Id. at 445.
285 See id. (underscoring that clarity about the paternal rights for those who participate in assisted
reproductive procedures is "critical").
286 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 2008) ("Any child born to a married woman by means
of artificial insemination performed by persons duly authorized to practice medicine and with the
consent in writing of the woman and her husband, shall be deemed the legitimate, birth child of the
husband and his wife for all purposes.").
287 NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, supra note 280, at 445 (indicating
further that if the woman's husband gave his consent and the procedure was performed by a licensed
physician, the donor will have no parental rights or responsibilities).
288 Id.
289 Id. at 446. This is one recommendation made with respect to surrogacy arrangements, but there
are several other recommendations. Id.
290 See id. at 445 (suggesting that men who donate semen should be able to relinquish rights and
responsibilities notwithstanding the marital status of the woman who ultimately uses the semen).
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Task Force asserted that an individual who dies before implantation of an
embryo or before a child is conceived using the individual's reproductive
material should not be considered a parent of that child.291
The other prominent issue addressed by the Task Force was the
disposition of frozen embryos, for which it provided a number of
recommendations. Among these are the suggestions that gamete banks be
required to obtain consent from the progenitors of the embryo before it is
destroyed or used for research, and that the progenitors should have the
power to direct the disposition of the created embryo in the event of death,
divorce, or loss of decision-making capacity.2 92 The Task Force expressly
directed how the decision-making authority with respect to embryos should
be divided and managed between the members of a couple. 293 Additionally,
it suggested that a gamete bank should ask individuals storing gametes for
future use with a partner to specify instructions for the disposition of the
gametes after their death. 294 The other recommendations made with respect
to the disposition of reproductive material are rooted in gamete bank
regulations. 295
2.

The Advisory Committee to the Chief Administrative Judge of the
Courts of the State of New York

Unlike the extensive set of recommendations offered by the Task Force,
the Advisory Committee focused its recommendations mainly on the
legitimacy of children born to a married couple using assisted
reproduction.2 96 The Committee advised that Section 73 of the DRL,
establishing the legitimacy of children born by AID to a married woman,
be extended to recognize the legitimacy of children born by more advanced
reproductive techniques to married women. 297 The "advanced techniques"
referred to include IVF and Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer (GIFT),298
291 Id. at 446.
292 Id. at 450.
293 Id. at 450-51.
294 Id. at 450.
295 See id. at 451 (suggesting that storage facilities establish policies for the disposition of
abandoned embryos and should inform participating/donating individuals of these policies at the time
the embryos are frozen).
296 2007 N.Y. Sess. Laws A-391-92, at A-391 (McKinney).
297 Id.
298 KINDREGAN & McBRIEN 1,supra note 8, at 82-83. Gamete intrafallopian transfer is defined as
a procedure in which an attempt is made to fertilize eggs by placing them with sperm in the fallopian
tubes of the recipient woman instead of attempting in vitro fertilization. Id. The resulting embryos are
then implanted in the uterus to produce pregnancy. Id. The procedure is generally abbreviated as GIFT.
Id. "In contrast to IVF, GIFT does not involve fertilization ex utero." Susan Goldberg, Of Gametes and
Guardians:The Impropriety of Appointing GuardiansAd Litem for Fetuses and Embryos, 66 WASH. L.
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which both use donated eggs and sperm that may have been frozen by
cryopreservation. 299
The Committee recommended that several revisions be made to Section
73 of the DRL.300 First, the Committee recommended that the statute
determine the legitimacy of children born to a married woman by assisted
reproduction (generally). 301 Second, it suggested that the language of the
statute should expressly establish the rights of such legitimate child to
inherit as the legitimate and natural issue of the husband and wife by
intestacy and class designation in testamentary instruments. 302 Third, and
finally, the Committee proposed the inclusion of a provision relieving the
donor(s) of parental rights, duties, and responsibilities toward the child and,
accordingly, prohibiting the child from inheriting as his issue. 303 Though
the suggested amendments to Section 73 comprised the majority of the
Committee's recommendation, the Committee also echoed the
recommendation of the Task Force in suggesting, "New York law should
provide that a woman who gives birth to a child is the child's legal mother,
even if the child was not conceived with the woman's egg." 304
B.

The Author's Response and Recommendations

In 1985, the New York Task Force compiled its recommendation when it
convened to respond to issues arising out of medical advances, including
reproductive technologies. 305 The Advisory Committee's recommendation
came out in the May 2007 issue of the New York Session Laws. 306 Thus, it
is clear that the need for legislation regarding these issues has been
recognized for more than two decades. However, over the last two
decades, New York State has made minimal progress in responding to that
need. Moreover, the only two recommendations made to the New York
Legislature regarding these issues offer insufficient solutions. A more
effective legislative approach would include a separate statute for each

REv. 503, 513 (1991). "After hormonal stimulation of the ovaries to produce oocytes, retrieval is
accomplished via the same methods utilized for IVF. The use of GIFT procedures has become
widespread in the last five years, with over one hundred infertility clinics reporting the availability of
the GIFT procedure." Id.
299 2007 N.Y. Sess. Laws, at A-391.
300 Id. at A-392.
301 Id.
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 Id.
305

See generally NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, supra note 280.

306 2007 N.Y. Sess. Laws A-391-92, at A-391 (McKinney).
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reproductive technology and would call for broad application of each
statute to traditional as well as non-traditional families.
The recommendation posed by the Task Force rightly addresses issues
arising out of cryopreservation-a technology that New York has barely
addressed-and offers several helpful recommendations regarding the
disposition of frozen embryos and the regulation of storage facilities.
However, the Task Force also asserts that a woman who gives birth to a
child is the child's legal mother, even if she is not genetically related to the
child, which is very problematic where reproductive technologies like
gestational surrogacy and embryo transfer are available. What is more
problematic is that this assertion is reaffirmed by the Advisory
Committee's recommendation. Based on this assertion, is one to conclude
that the act of giving birth is the utmost determination of motherhood that
supersedes all else ... even if an enforceable surrogacy or an alternate
reproduction agreement exists in New York?
As stated above, though Section 123 of the DRL307 effectively prohibits
surrogacy contracts, and Section 122308 asserts that they are against public
policy, in practice, the surrogacy procedure is generally still lawful where it
is not part of a compensation agreement. Thus, this maternity assertion is
especially problematic because of the capacity of several reproductive
technologies to split the dual roles of gestational and genetic motherhood
between two women. Consider the situation in which an infertile woman
has opted to have a child, lawfully, through gestational surrogacy or
embryo adoption. 309 If the Task Force recommendation were accepted, the
woman seeking to have this child, who is neither the genetic mother nor the
gestational mother of the child, could potentially have the fewest parental
rights to that child. This scenario demonstrates the need for pliable laws
that consider and reflect each reproductive technology, its procedures, and
its individual implications.
Though the Advisory Committee's proposed amendment to Section 73
of the DRL does expand the current law to apply to reproductive
technologies in general, a mere amendment to Section 73 is not an adequate
legislative approach for responding to these issues for two reasons. First,
as demonstrated by the gestational surrogacy example above, different
technologies implicate the law in different ways and must therefore be
307 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 123 (McKinney 2008) (providing civil penalties for the creation of a
surrogacy contract for any compensation other than medical expenses).
308 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 2008) (stating that such contracts are void and
unenforceable).
309 See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discussing embryo transfer).
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regulated individually. In further support of this assertion, consider a
married woman inheriting her deceased husband's cryogenically frozen
sperm, which he expressly intends for her to use to produce his child. She
is artificially inseminated with the sperm after his death and has his child.
Technically the sperm used belongs to her husband; but, since he is
deceased, should the sperm be considered donor sperm? If so, the woman
has her deceased husband's consent required under proposed Section 73,
but is she still considered married after his death? Would this child be
considered his legitimate issue? If the child was bom many years after his
death, should he still be considered his issue? A thorough legislative
scheme, specifically addressing cyropreservation, would provide answers
to all of these questions.
The second shortcoming of the amended Section 73 is that it only applies
to married individuals. Part of what is so appealing about alternative
reproductive approaches, for many, is the ability to reproduce outside of the
traditional heterosexual married unit. Moreover, New York courts have
interpreted DRL Section 117 to allow both heterosexual singles and
homosexual partners of birth parents to adopt children. 3 10 Why then, should
these individuals be deprived of the ability to conceive their own child?
Such a law may be considered discriminatory, in depriving certain
individuals of their constitutional right to procreate based on their marital
status or their sexual preference. Though the Court has not specifically
addressed the constitutional right of homosexual individuals to procreate,
in Skinner v. Oklahoma,3 11 the U.S. Supreme Court asserted in dicta that
the right to reproduce is "one of the basic civil rights of man," 312 and this
assumption prevails today.
Thus, an effective legislative scheme for addressing the many legal
issues raised by reproductive technologies will include specific statutes for
each reproductive technology that apply to married individuals and single
individuals who are either heterosexuals or homosexuals. A broad
application of these statutes would allow each reproductive technology to
be considered within each of the different "familial" circumstances in
which it may be employed. Such an applicable and thorough legislative
scheme would ease the burden of the courts in deciding cases involving
310 See supra notes 202-09 and accompanying text (describing the case of Karin T. v. Michael T.,
in which petitioner was married to a person living as a man, though formerly a woman, and petitioner
argued that she was not responsible for supporting children she was not biologically related to nor had
she adopted).
311 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
312 Id. at 541 (1942); Coleman, supra note 8, at 61.
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reproductive technologies, would result in consistent treatment of the issues
they raise, and would allow the accessibility and success of reproductive
technologies to continue to grow.
CONCLUSION

Recent rapid advances in reproductive technology have challenged the
law's ability to evolve at a similarly rapid pace. New York is among the
many states that have neither legislatively nor decisionally addressed many
of the issues that arise out of reproductive technology. Though some may
question whether the possibilities offered by reproductive technologies
outweigh the problems, the fact is that these procedures have and will
continue to change the traditional family. It is time for the law to release
tradition and respond to change. Ideally, the response to these issues
should come from the legislature, so as to ease the burden on the courts and
to resolve these issues more expediently. An effective legislative scheme
for the New York Legislature to adopt will include a series of nondiscriminatory statutes-applicable to all individuals regardless of marital
status or sexual orientation-that individually address each reproductive
technology and its legal implications. Such legislation will clarify, if not
resolve, the inheritance and legitimacy issues that arise out of assisted
reproduction and the various reproductive technologies through which it is
employed.

